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I. INTRODUCTION
A young person in a hooded sweatshirt saunters down a suburban
sidewalk. When a police cruiser rounds the corner, they duck their head,
avoiding eye contact.  Normally, the officer behind the wheel would chance
a glance at this relatively inconspicuous person.  Perhaps the officer would
feel a twinge of suspicion due to the person’s attire or somewhat elusive 
behavior. Absent additional indicia of criminal activity,1 the officer’s
interest would wane almost immediately: an officer patrolling a crime 
hotspot would wait for a hot lead, and even a bored officer in a low-crime 
area has more important things to do.  The encounter would barely amount 
to a blip. 
1. The “reasonable suspicion” standard is an “elusive” one.  Margaret Raymond, 
Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood
in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 102 (1999).  An officer must 
determine the probability that criminal activity is afoot based on factual observations that
“in light of the officer’s experience, demonstrate a sufficient quantum of probability that 
an individual is involved in criminal activity.”  Id. at 104. The suspicion must also be 
particularized, and thus based on the behavior of the individual.  See id. at 105–06.  Here, 
an officer could not express the requisite “specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with the rational inferences from those facts,” established reasonable suspicion.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).  However, the Terry “reasonable suspicion”
doctrine has been stretched thin since the case was decided. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (finding a stop legal when the individual was in a “high crime
area” and exhibited “nervous, evasive behavior” (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
147 (1972))); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1996) (allowing stop and 
frisk following even minor violations of traffic laws); Adams, 407 U.S. at 147–48 (blurring
the distinction between stops and protective frisks). 
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However, this police cruiser has cameras equipped with facial recognition 
technology (FRT). As soon as the vehicle rounds the corner, an FRT camera 
scans the person’s face, maps their facial features, and converts that data 
into a numerical “faceprint.”2  Before the person ducks their head, the FRT 
software identifies them by comparing that faceprint to a database of 
“known faces.”3 The facial recognition system instantly provides the officer 
the person’s name, address, criminal history, and other personal information.4 
The officer notes several factors that, in combination with the elusive
conduct, lead the officer to form an articulable, reasonable suspicion that
the young person is involved in criminal activity.5  The officer asks them 
to stop, which they do.  The officer conducts a protective frisk, running 
their hands along the person’s body, squeezing to ensure they possess no 
concealed weapons.6  The officer asks a barrage of questions about who
the person is, where they are going, and what they are doing. All the 
while, the person’s reputation in the community suffers due to the stigma 
attached to a subject of a police investigation in public view.7 
Depending on what flagged the officer’s attention, the public reaction
is likely to vary. If the officer discovered an open warrant for the person’s 
arrest related to a violent felony charge, technology enhanced policing is 
the hero of the day, enhancing public safety.8  However, the public might 
2. See infra Section II.A.
 3. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
4. Hypothetically, the officer could even access social media posts.  See, e.g., Olivia 
Solon, Facial Recognition’s ‘Dirty Little Secret’: Millions of Online Photos Scraped Without 
Consent, NBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2019, 1:32 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/ 
facial-recognition-s-dirty-little-secret-millions-online-photos-scraped-n981921 [https:// 
perma.cc/GQS3-NARY].
5. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123–24 (“The officer must be able to articulate more 
than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch”’ of criminal activity.” 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27)).  See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and 
Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 331 (2015) (analyzing the shift 
from traditional reasonable suspicion to “big data” enhanced policing that “undermines 
the protection that reasonable suspicion provides against police stops” and noting that the 
same reasonable suspicion standard might justify stops proscribed by predictive policing 
software).
6. The law allows this type of protective frisk if the officer can articulate some
reason for fearing for their safety.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30–31. 
7. See Joel S. Johnson, Comment, Benefits of Error in Criminal Justice, 102 VA.
L. REV. 237, 272–75 (2016) (discussing how the stigma of arrest attaches irrespective of
guilt or conviction). 
8. See Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than
the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 56 (1994) (“[U]nreasonable searches and seizures rarely 
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be less enthused if the grounds for the officer’s suspicion were less 
menacing: a conviction for theft; several delinquent parking tickets; a 
prior FRT identification near a crime scene a day, month, or year prior to 
the encounter; a student visa about to expire;9 the person’s distasteful 
associates on Facebook; membership in an unsavory political or religious 
organization; anti-establishment, anti-police, or “suspicious” social media 
posts; or identification as a government whistleblower.  The more private 
and less threatening the stimulus, the more likely an objective observer is 
to cry foul.10 
attract media attention or arouse the community—‘no other constitutional guarantee is so 
openly flouted with so little public outcry’—that courts should not rely on ‘other methods’
of enforcement when the search and seizure guarantee is flouted. [Society needs a Fourth 
Amendment b]ecause the people who are illegally arrested and illegally searched are often 
despised, and because they are usually ‘unrepresentative of the larger class of law-abiding 
citizens.’” (quoting Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a 
“Principled Basis” Rather than an “Empirical Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 
613 (1983))).
9. It is important to note that the law allows law enforcement to stop individuals 
for a variety of reasons without much justification already.  Harvey Gee, Almost Gone: 
The Vanishing Fourth Amendment’s Allowance of Stingray Surveillance in a Post-Carpenter 
Age, 28 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 409, 410 (2019).  Police can stop drivers for “just 
about any reason under the pretext” of a traffic violation.  Id.  Individuals may “be stopped 
while . . . walking down the street in a ‘high crime area’ and checked for an active arrest 
warrant.” Id. (citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124). 
10. Public outcry has been at the precipice of many developments in Fourth 
Amendment law, including the Fourth Amendment itself.  See, e.g., Buritica v. United States, 
8 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1194 (1998) (noting that a cash incentive program employed by U.S. 
Customs bore a “striking resemblance to British colonial practices that helped to spark the 
American Revolution and led to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment”); Eric Blumenson 
& Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 35, 75 n.143 (1998) (“John Adams . . . wrote that public outcry against the writs
of assistance was one of the sparks leading to American independence.” (emphasis added)).  
When government surveillance and policing practices invade further upon “innocent” citizens’ 
privacy rights, public outcry is amplified.  See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin 
Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 281, 322 (2016) (“[W]hen the TSA started to use x-ray machines that were too revealing 
of people’s bodies, there was an immediate outcry and the practice was stopped.”); Jonathan 
Weisman, Momentum Builds Against N.S.A. Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/us/politics/momentum-builds-against-nsa-
surveillance.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/5P8L-LSZ8]. However, the public
also reacts negatively to the Fourth Amendment’s remedy—the Exclusionary Rule. For 
example, when police gather evidence without following Fourth Amendment guidelines, 
critics have called the subsequent exclusion of the “tainted” evidence from use against the 
criminal defendant as a “windfall” for that defendant.  See Margareth Etienne, Remorse, 
Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 2151 & n.213 (2003) 
(describing one case in which public pressure was exerted on a judge who followed the 
rule—United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated by 921 F. Supp. 211 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996)). 
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This scenario should be ringing the “Big Brother” bell. In George
Orwell’s classic novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, the state reminds its citizens
that “Big Brother is watching you.”11  The novel explores a dystopian
future in which government surveillance is constant, and the “Thought 
Police” attempt to root out politically subversive citizens.12  Themes of 
intrusive government surveillance and overly invasive police procedures 
are common in science-fiction and conspiracy-based entertainment.13 
Facial recognition technology is no longer stuff of science fiction nor
of prognostication; it is a modern reality.  FRT enables cameras to scan a 
face, analyze its facial geometry, and compare that mathematical formulation 
with databases of known faces to determine a match.14  In China, the 
government uses FRT to identify and fine jaywalkers and capture drivers 
violating traffic rules.15  In the United States, Customs and Border Protection 
uses FRT at domestic airports to verify the identity of international passengers, 
streamlining the customs departure process.16  For well over a decade, police
departments across the country have been attaching live-scanning devices 
to police vehicles to read license plates and instantly identify if a vehicle 
is stolen, has a lapsed registration, or has delinquent parking tickets.17 
11. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN-EIGHTY-FOUR 2 (1949). 
12. Id. at 59.  Sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI), which can predict human
behaviors based on data inputs, could become Orwell’s “Thought Police.”  See generally 
ARMANDO VIEIRA, REDZEBRA ANALYTICS PREDICTING ONLINE USER BEHAVIOR USING DEEP 
LEARNING ALGORITHMS (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1511.06247.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9D4Q-Y2CA] (discussing how machine learning facilitates predicting people’s future e-
commerce behaviors).
13. See, e.g., DAVID EGGERS, THE CIRCLE (2013); EAGLE EYE (K/O Paper Products 
2008); ENEMY OF THE STATE (Touchstone Pictures 1998); MINORITY REPORT (20th Century 
Fox 2002).
14. For a detailed description of how facial recognition technology works, see How 
Does Facial Recognition Work?, NORTON BY SYMANTEC, https://us.norton.com/internet
security-iot-how-facial-recognition-software-works.html [https://perma.cc/V5FZ-X7LX].
 15. Christina Zhao, Jaywalking in China: Facial Recognition Surveillance Will Soon 
Fine Citizens via Text Message, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 27, 2018, 9:34 AM), https://www.
newsweek.com/jaywalking-china-facial-recognition-surveillance-will-soon-fine-citizens-
text-861401 [https://perma.cc/9WJ4-8FGX]. The Chinese government also equips law
enforcement with FRT-enabled sunglasses, facilitating the instant identification of criminals 
and other targets.  Id. 
16. Michael Kirkham, Airport Facial Recognition Technology Runs into Privacy 
Fears, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/travel/story/2019-
08-22/facial-recognition-biometrics-at-airports-proliferating [https://perma.cc/52U3-L4RY]. 
17. POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., HOW ARE INNOVATIONS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFORMING 
POLICING? 1–2 (2012), https://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/
how%20are%20innovations%20in%20technology%20transforming%20policing%20201 
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In addition to the deployment of live-scanning FRT cameras, private 
companies and the government are compiling immense databases of 
personal information at a feverous pace.18  The FBI compiles biometric
information—unique physical characteristics like DNA, fingerprints, and 
facial images19—from other law enforcement agencies and from agencies 
to which citizens submitted their biometric data for licensing or employment.20 
Private companies collect demographic and behavioral data to improve 
targeted advertising.21  Almost 70% of Americans use Facebook,22 which 
collects and shares personal information with third parties in addition to 
maintaining records of every activity ever conducted by its users on the 
site.23  As our society continues its trend toward digitization, the personal
2.pdf [https://perma.cc/89PW-5YJZ].  Another technology that police departments across 
the country have widely deployed in the last couple of decades is the automated license 
plate scanner.  See Julia M. Brooks, Drawing the Lines: Regulation of Automatic License 
Plate Readers in Virginia, 25 RICHMOND J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2019).  License plate scanning 
implicates the same privacy concerns—law enforcement’s ability to track the movements 
of individuals over time—as described by the D.C. Court of Appeals in United States v. 
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  Brooks, supra, at 8. 
 18. Richie Koch, Massive Corporate Databases Become Government Tools 
of Surveillance, PROTONMAIL (June 16, 2020), https://protonmail.com/blog/privacy-user-
data-requests/ [https://perma.cc/TAV2-LJDY].
19. See infra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
20. Fingerprints and Other Biometrics, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/
fingerprints-and-other-biometrics [https://perma.cc/LH8Y-6HUM].  The FBI categorizes 
these into two datasets: one set accumulated from photos acquired by law enforcement and 
another set of photos acquired by other governmental agencies for civil purposes.  See 
Ernest J. Babcock, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) 
Interstate Photo System, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/ 
privacy-impact-assessments/interstate-photo-system [https://perma.cc/ZA9F-PSH6]. The
FBI maintains a database of biometric identifiers acquired via criminal proceedings, which 
includes fingerprints, DNA, and photos—such as mugshots—obtained incident to arrest 
or pursuant to criminal investigations.  See id.  The civil database includes photos, fingerprints, 
and other information acquired by the government related to employment, licensing applications, 
and other civil processes.  Id.  Currently, the FBI prohibits law enforcement users from 
searching the civil database; however, individuals who have a criminal profile in the system 
will have their civil biometric information added to their criminal profile, making that 
information searchable.  Id.  There is a third database maintained by the FBI that is handled 
separately and with which restrictions are far less stringent: the Unsolved Photo File 
(UPF).  See infra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
21. See Max Freedman, How Businesses Are Collecting Data (And What They’re 
Doing with It), BUS. NEWS DAILY (June 17, 2020), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/ 
10625-businesses-collecting-data.html [https://perma.cc/B6WQ-RPVT]. 
22.  John Gramlich, 10 Facts About Facebook, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/16/facts-about-americans-and-facebook 
[https://perma.cc/6436-WWND].
 23. Kristen Korosec, This Is the Personal Data that Facebook Collects—And 
Sometimes Sells, FORTUNE (Mar. 21, 2018, 7:32 AM), https://fortune.com/2018/03/21/ 
facebook-personal-data-cambridge-analytica [https://perma.cc/AE9N-R8K2]. 
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information captured within various databases will continue to grow 
exponentially. 
The combination of improving FRT with massive databases inevitably 
leads to infringement upon the First Amendment rights of millions of 
Americans.24  If the faces of Americans on social media become part of 
FRT databases used by law enforcement, American citizens will be less 
likely to post their images online or to use social media at all.25  Those
who wish to maintain a measure of anonymity when in public will be 
24. See Kristine Hamann & Rachel Smith, Facial Recognition Technology: Where 
Will It Take Us?, A.B.A.: CRIM. JUST. MAG., Spring 2019, at 9, 12, https://www.american 
bar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publications/criminal-justice-magazine/2019/spring/facial-
recognition-technology [https://perma.cc/8M7D-AVNN] (“Critics also have argued that
FRT may implicate the First Amendment right to freedom of association and right to 
privacy.”).  Several cases have “upheld the right to anonymous speech and association,” 
which allows individuals to advocate for minority causes without fear of retaliation.  Id. at 
13 (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958)); see also, e.g., 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 
U.S. 60, 64 (1960). 
Without these protections, the use of FRT could have a chilling effect on
individuals’ behaviors and lead to self-censorship. Nevertheless, some courts
have considered law enforcement’s use of photography at public demonstrations 
as not violating the First Amendment right to freedom of association. On the 
other hand, specific, targeted surveillance of a group may cross the line and violate 
First Amendment association protections.  For example, the Second Circuit in
Hassan v. City of New York determined that the NYPD’s targeted use of pervasive
video, photographic, and undercover surveillance of Muslim Americans may
have caused those individuals “direct, ongoing, and immediate harm,” and it
may have created a chilling effect.  Privacy advocates have been particularly 
critical of the use of FRT in widespread surveillance. The FRT program that
was used to monitor the protestors in Baltimore during the Freddie Gray protests 
were widely criticized for many reasons, including a fear that African Americans
were overrepresented in the facial recognition repository. 
Hamann & Smith, supra, at 13 (citations omitted) (first citing Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 
(1972); Phila. Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc’y of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d 1335, 1337–
38 (3d Cir. 1974); Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 1972); then citing
Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 292 (3d Cir. 2015)). 
25. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of social media as an
essential tool for the exchange of views and ideas in today’s internet-connected world.  See 
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).  “In short, social media users 
employ these websites to engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity on 
topics ‘as diverse as human thought.’”  Id. at 1735–36 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 
844, 870 (1997)).  However, social media platforms themselves affirmatively act to allow 
or disallow user-posted content, limiting some expression.  See VALERIE C. BRANNON, 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45650, FREE SPEECH AND THE REGULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
CONTENT 1–2 (2019).  For an in-depth analysis regarding Congress’s ability to regulate 
such decisions by social media platforms, like Facebook, see generally id. 
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unable to do so if their photo is online or they provided it to a government 
agency.26  More importantly, critics of the government could abstain from 
public speech knowing that every detail of their identity would be known 
merely by exposing their face.  The chilling effect on First Amendment rights 
is reason enough for lawmakers to deem FRT’s use by law enforcement 
unconstitutional. 
Unfortunately, the courts are unlikely to bar law enforcement’s use of
FRT on the American public. Under current Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment doctrine, the Court probably would not classify FRT scans as
searches.27  The ability to challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment 
rests on whether an individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
a particular location.28 In public, a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy is almost non-existent.29  Moreover, even if courts’ conception of 
the Fourth Amendment shifts, the judiciary cannot move quickly enough 
to prevent unprecedented privacy invasions because the courts are ill-
equipped to keep up with new technological developments.30  Thus, to
prevent FRT from eroding the privacy rights of most Americans, Congress 
must enact federal legislation that directly addresses FRT.31 
New legislation, instead of the judicial process, offers a more streamlined
route to addressing law enforcement’s use of FRT.  Relying on the legislative 
process to address emerging issues presents political challenges.  
However, it offers an avenue to protection that does not require years of 
litigation. Legislation that considers FRT is sparse, but some states have 
passed laws to address aspects of its use.32  However, there is no all-
encompassing legislative provision that addresses FRT head on.  To limit 
law enforcement’s development of databases that include the faces of 
26.  The government requires individuals to submit photographs of their faces for a 
wide range of services and for some basic rights.  Driver’s licenses are the most obtained 
form of identification, which over 87% of Americans had as of 2009.  Our Nation’s 
Highways: 2011, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/
pubs/hf/pl11028/chapter4.cfm [https://perma.cc/DTJ5-366Q] (last updated Nov. 7, 2014). 
To obtain a passport—required for international travel—an American citizen is required
to provide a photo to the State Department.  See Photo Identification, U.S. DEPT. ST., https://
travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/passports/how-apply/identification.html [https://perma.cc/
4J8N-6RT3].
27. See infra Part V. At least as far as the Fourth Amendment is currently conceptualized,
the Court’s rationale does not provide a clear path to barring FRT. 
28. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88–89 (1998); see also Minnesota v. Olson, 
495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (extending Fourth Amendment protection to an overnight guest). 
29. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see also infra Section 
V.B.1. 
30. See infra Section V.C.
 31. See infra Part VI. 
32. See infra Part IV. 
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most Americans, to provide some modicum of protection for public 
anonymity, and to protect the privacy of the innocent, Congress must act.
This Comment implores Congress to limit the development of law 
enforcement FRT databases.  In Part II, the Comment describes facial
recognition technology, examining its development and uses.  This section 
describes how law enforcement compiles databases of faces.  It concludes
by exploring potential future applications of the technology.  Part III discusses 
the privacy rights angle, answering why the American population should
be concerned about—and why legislators should act to prevent—
unchecked FRT-equipped law enforcement. 
Part IV addresses the current statutory framework that governs law 
enforcement’s use of FRT.  In this section, the Comment points out the
general lack of enacted legislation regarding the use of biometric information
by law enforcement.  The analysis shows that current statutory law is blind 
to the potential abuses of FRT-equipped law enforcement agencies, making 
the technology ripe for exploitation.
In Part V, the Comment reviews Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and
its applicability to FRT.  Further, this section examines Supreme Court
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and concludes that recent decisions indicate
that the Court would be unlikely to hold law enforcement’s uninhibited
use of FRT unconstitutional.  The section concludes that relying on the courts 
to protect citizens from technology’s encroachment on Fourth Amendment
rights will result in millions of Americans losing privacy rights, even if the
Court eventually changes its conception of what the Fourth Amendment
protects.
Part VI proffers a legislative solution to directly address FRT’s use by
law enforcement. The solution requires congressional action that addresses
privacy concerns while still allowing law enforcement to use the cutting-
edge technology. The proposed solution has two primary prongs: first, 
amending the U.S. Code to limit the authorization of the FBI’s collection
and compilation of facial images to those obtained by law enforcement and
correctional entities; second, proposing a new law that vests responsibility 
for the collection of non-criminal identification information in the Department 
of Health and Human Services, or another non-law enforcement agency. 
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II. HOW FRT FUNCTIONS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF 
BIOMETRIC IDENTIFIERS 
A. FRT Basics 
Understanding the intricacies of how FRT functions is a critical step
towards determining how to regulate its use as a law enforcement search 
tool. Thinking of FRT as a tool that enhances an officer’s natural ability 
to pick people out of a crowd oversimplifies the issue.  FRT is a mechanism 
that gives law enforcement the power to analyze biometric information of 
potential suspects in real-time or retrospectively.33 
1. Biometrics 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines biometrics as 
“unique physical characteristics, such as fingerprints, that can be used for 
automated recognition.”34  In addition to fingerprints, biometric identifiers 
include “DNA, irises, voice patterns, palm prints, and facial patterns.”35 
Law enforcement collects this information and submits it to the FBI; the 
FBI then stores this information in various databases and makes it accessible 
to law enforcement on a local level.36  Much like matching DNA records
obtained at a crime scene to the DNA of the perpetrator, obtaining the data 
necessary to run an FRT search involves a complex process to obtain 
matches. 
33. See Kimberly N. Brown, Anonymity, Faceprints, and the Constitution, 21 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 409, 429–30 (2014). 
34. Biometrics, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (July 13, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/ 
biometrics [https://perma.cc/ZSY6-LLSF].
35. Fingerprints and Other Biometrics, supra note 20. 
36. Id.  The FBI maintains several databases dedicated to particular types of biometric
identification information and has a lengthy history of providing that information to othe
law enforcement agencies.  See id.  Next Generation Identification is an FBI system geare
towards identifying people by their fingerprints, palm prints, irises, and faces.  Id.  Th
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) “allows labs to exchange and compare DN
profiles to link” criminals to DNA evidence found in new investigations.  Id.  The Foreig
Biometric Exchange (FBE) Program “collect[s] high value biometrics obtained from foreig
law enforcement partners [relating to] individuals of interest to partner countries, the Unite
States, or the international law enforcement community, and include individuals associate
with or appropriately suspected of terrorist activity, egregious crimes, or transnationa
criminal activity.”  Id.  The Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) Initiativ
requires partner nations, as part of the Visa Waiver Program, “to enter into a PCSC agreemen
to share criminal and terrorist biometrics with the U.S.  The Criminal Justice Informatio
Services Division acts as the technical implementer for the Department of Justice to provid
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2. How FRT Works 
Identifying a person with FRT begins with a scan that produces an 
image.37  From that image, the FRT system must first recognize that a face 
is present.38  Once the system identifies a face, FRT software creates a 
“faceprint.”39  A faceprint is a numerical code generated by mapping 
distinguishable facial landmarks, such as the distance between the eyes, 
the width of the nose, the depth of eye sockets, the shape of the cheekbones, 
and the length of the jawline.40  Alternatively, software can generate a 
faceprint by analyzing the attributes of the skin, such as texture, lines, or 
by mapping pore locations.41  This faceprint is then cross-referenced with 
a database of known faces to identify a match.42  The software is capable
of mapping faces from both photographs or videos, which could be 
recorded or live-streamed.43 
3. FRT Shortcomings & Criticisms 
One major criticism of FRT is that it cannot consistently identify 
women and people of color accurately.44 FRT identifies white males at a
37. See Kevin Bonsor & Ryan Johnson, How Facial Recognition Systems Work, 
HOWSTUFFWORKS, https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/high-tech-gadgets/facial-
recognition1.htm [https://perma.cc/73A3-D2ZY].  For a brief facial recognition demonstration, 
see How Does Facial Recognition Work?, NBC NEWS (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.
nbcnews.com/now/video/how-does-facial-recognition-work-66901573848 [https://perma.cc/
NQ3F-52GS].
38. See Bonsor & Johnson, supra note 37. 
39. Id. 
40. Id.
 41. Brown, supra note 33, at 427. 
42.  Bonsor & Johnson, supra note 37. 
43. See Brown, supra note 33, at 429–30.  Several law enforcement agencies are working
with private companies to rapidly analyze “live footage from closed-circuit surveillance 
cameras.”  Id. at 430.  New York City, the District of Columbia, Los Angeles, and some 
Florida police departments are pursuing enhanced live-video FRT capabilities.  Id. 
 44. See, e.g., Queenie Wong, Why Facial Recognition’s Racial Bias Problem Is So 
Hard to Crack, CNET (Mar. 27, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/why-facial-
recognitions-racial-bias-problem-is-so-hard-to-crack [https://perma.cc/44PJ-KDNX] (40%
of identification errors made by Amazon’s facial recognition tool, used by law enforcement, 
involved people of color).  Journalists and scholars have made this FRT issue a well-
documented one.  See, e.g., Drew Harwell, Facial Recognition Technology Is Finally More 
Accurate in Identifying People of Color. Could That Be Used Against Immigrants?, WASH. 
POST (June 28, 2018, 6:56 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/06/ 
28/facial-recognition-technology-is-finally-more-accurate-identifying-people-color-could- 
that-be-used-against-immigrants [https://perma.cc/R6RM-K69C]; Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition 
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99% accuracy rate.45  In contrast, when the target of identification is a dark-
skinned woman, the accuracy rate drops to 65%, making it only slightly 
more effective than a coin flip.46  In addition to difficulties with identifying 
people of color, FRT has also produced a significantly higher false-positive 
identification rate with darker-skinned people.47  If police use FRT that is
deficient in this way, not only will it be ineffective, but it will also result 
in the inadvertent targeting of innocents—and particularly innocents 
within the minority population—who are incorrectly identified during law 
enforcement investigations.48  Even more concerning is the likelihood that 
police officers will trust the technology over their own intuition.49  FRT’s
identification and false-positive issues begin with the training of the FRT 
software.50 
Is Accurate, if You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/
9N5D-AFZU].
45. Lohr, supra note 44. 
46. Id. 
47. See Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy 
Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 1, 9 
(2018), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
CQT5-VSL8]. In analyzing the ability of three commercially available facial recognition 
software systems in identifying gender, the false positive rate for light-skinned men and 
women was between 0% and 1.6%; for dark-skinned women, the false positive rate was 
between 15.8% and 22.2%. Id. 
48. See Jon Sharman, Metropolitan Police’s Facial Recognition Technology 98% 
Inaccurate, Figures Show, INDEP. (May 13, 2018, 1:07 PM), https://www.independent.co.
uk/news/uk/home-news/met-police-facial-recognition-success-south-wales-trial-home-
office-false-positive-a8345036.html [https://perma.cc/F3QR-2X7E].  The United Kingdom’s 
largest police force used FRT to a 98% false positive rate.  Id.  Of the 104 alerts, only two 
were accurate.  Id. 
49. Many people can relate to the idea of over-trusting technology because, generally,
it produces more accurate results than we can ourselves.  See, e.g., Kalev Leetaru, Why Do 
We Trust GPS More than We Trust Ourselves?, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2016, 10:13 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2016/04/30/why-do-we-trust-gps-more-than-
we-trust-ourselves/#6c92c33b2c42 [https://perma.cc/MAH3-KMPG] (relaying a story
about a construction company that demolished the wrong house because Google Maps 
sent its workers there).  Map applications on our mobile devices are merely one example 
of how this affects us, but there a myriad of other instances exist where we rely on technology 
to our potential detriment.  We rely on spell check to ensure our documents and emails are 
not littered with typos; we rely on Google to tell us the opening and closing hours of stores 
and restaurants.  When technology fails us, it is generally a frustrating experience.  
However, if FRT fails in its policing application, the ramifications could be life altering. 
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FRT software is a kind of artificial intelligence (AI) that learns over 
time, “incorporate[ing] real-world experience in its decision making.”51 
FRT programmers train the AI that maps and matches faces using “deep 
52learning networks.”   This process involves exposing the AI to large data
sets, broken up into smaller chunks, repetitively.53  Over time, the AI learns
from feedback given to it by software engineers when it correctly or 
incorrectly makes an identification.54 
Programmers train FRT systems by feeding datasets containing images 
of faces and non-faces to AI so that it can learn what is and what is not a 
face.55 When the set of faces used to train the AI lacks diversity—for
example, if databases used to train FRT AI contain mostly lighter-skinned 
faces56—the AI does not learn to differentiate a dark-skinned face from a 
non-face.57  Exacerbating the bias created in FRT AI in its applications to 
policing is the fact that the databases used by law enforcement—mostly 
from mugshots—have a disproportionate composition of African American 
51. Darrell M. West, What Is Artificial Intelligence?, BROOKINGS (Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-is-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/7HSR-
QV7Y]. AI systems simulate human responses to stimuli, “given the human capacity for 
contemplation, judgment, and intention.”  Id.  “[T]hese software systems ‘make decisions 
which normally require [a] human level of expertise’ and help people anticipate problems 
or deal with issues as they come up.”  Id. 
52. See Matt Shipman, New Technique Cuts AI Training Time by More than 60 
Percent, N.C. ST. U. (Apr. 8, 2019), https://news.ncsu.edu/2019/04/new-technique-cuts-
ai-training-time-by-more-than-60-percent [https://perma.cc/F736-KSPP].
Deep learning networks are at the heart of AI applications used in everything
from self-driving cars to computer vision technologies,” says Xipeng Shen, a
professor of computer science at NC State and co-author of a paper on the work. 
[¶] “One of the biggest challenges facing the development of new AI tools is 
the amount of time and computing power it takes to train deep learning networks 
to identify and respond to the data patterns that are relevant to their applications. 
Id.
 53. Id. 
54. See Buolamwini, supra note 50. 
55. Id. 
56. See Rachel Siegel, Rashida Tlaib Isn’t the Only One Who Thinks Race Biases 
Facial Recognition Results, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2019, 2:27 PM), https://www.washington 
post.com/technology/2019/10/04/rashida-tlaib-isnt-only-one-who-thinks-race-biases-
facial-recognition-results [https://perma.cc/V8NP-PQEX]. Programmers are probably not 
creating bias in AI intentionally.  Instead, the issue is that the racial disparity in the facial 
images used for training FRT systems could mirror the demographic makeup of the country; 
over three-quarters of the American population is white, and less than 14% identify as 
solely black or African American.  See QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.
gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/7P94-46H8]. 
57. See Buolamwini, supra note 50. 
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faces.58  Thus, the databases of faces used to train FRT differ significantly 
from criminal facial databases.  Although this issue is problematic, fixing 
it only requires that programmers train FRT systems with a higher proportion 
of women and minority faces. However, even if programmers eliminate 
racial and gender bias from FRT systems, issues regarding the source of 
facial images in FRT databases remain. 
FRT databases consist of faces from a variety of sources.  Technology 
companies have compiled databases of faces to train their FRT AI to 
improve its recognition capabilities.59 Once these datasets have been 
assembled and distributed, the datasets likely exist in perpetuity.60 
Companies compile datasets by pulling publicly available photos from 
photo-sharing websites, social media,61 dating services, and surveillance
58. See Lohr, supra note 44 (noting that African Americans make up a disproportionate
percentage of mugshot databases). 
59. Cade Metz, Facial Recognition Tech Is Growing Stronger, Thanks to Your Face, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/13/technology/databases-
faces-facial-recognition-technology.html [https://perma.cc/QMX3-GVX5].  Microsoft deleted 
its massive database of approximately 10 million images because government regulation 
of FRT fell short of Microsoft’s standards.  Microsoft Deletes Massive Face Recognition 
Database, BBC NEWS (June 7, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48555149
[https://perma.cc/SJQ4-TWXB] (“The deletion comes after Microsoft called on US politicians 
to do a better job of regulating recognition systems.”).  Microsoft has been leading the 
charge in calls to more closely regulate FRT because of its “potential . . . to erode civil 
liberties.”  See Nicole Lindsey, Microsoft Deletes Massive Facial Recognition Database, 
CPO MAG. (July 2, 2019), https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-privacy/microsoft-deletes-
massive-facial-recognition-database/ [https://perma.cc/H7MF-LGLG].  But see Melissa 
Locker, Microsoft, Duke, and Stanford Quietly Delete Databases with Millions of Faces, 
FAST CO. (June 6, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90360490/ms-celeb-microsoft-
deletes-10m-faces-from-face-database [https://perma.cc/YE3L-KJ8Q] (“While it’s good
that someone is stepping up to lead, don’t hurt your hands applauding Microsoft too hard.  
The company may claim it wants regulations for facial recognition, but it also wants to use 
facial recognition technology to sell you stuff at Kroger through Minority Report-
like ads—and it has eluded privacy-related scrutiny for years.”). 
60. Id. 
61.  Facebook presents unique issues.  Seven in ten American adults use Facebook. 
Gramlich, supra note 22.  Facebook claims its facial recognition is accurate 97.35% of the 
time.  Yaniv Taigman et al., DeepFace: Closing the Gap to Human-level Performance in Face 
Verification, 2014 PROC. IEEE CONF. COMPUT. VISION & PATTERN RECOGNITION 1701, 
1701, 1705–06 (2014), https://research.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/deepface-closing- 
the-gap-to-human-level-performance-in-face-verification.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HLZ-AJXR].
Facebook users are familiar with Facebook’s version of FRT: whenever they post pictures
of or with other users when the platform suggests “tagging” the other person in the photo 
or when Facebook notifies a user that they may be in a photo posted by someone else.  See 
Srinivas Narayanan, An Update About Face Recognition on Facebook, FACEBOOK (Sept.
3, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/09/update-face-recognition [https://perma.cc/ 
7G86-QE65]. However, on September 3, 2019, Facebook changed how it implements its
FRT, allowing users to opt-in. Id. The unparalleled extent of Facebook’s userbase, all
with pictures, combined with Facebook’s exceptional facial recognition capabilities—
notably, the large dataset of photographs likely shortened the learning curve for Facebook
156
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systems.62  In other words, private companies use the faces of American 
citizens without their consent to strengthen their FRT systems.63  Although
many of these private companies have declined to provide these databases 
to law enforcement agencies amid privacy concerns,64 at least one company 
has sold its FRT system and database of faces to hundreds of American 
law enforcement agencies recently.65  In lieu of commercially available 
databases, law enforcement has assembled FRT databases of its own. 
AI—gives it immense influence on FRT’s future development. See April Glaser, Facebook’s
Face-ID Database Could Be the Biggest in the World. Yes, It Should Worry Us, SLATE 
(July 9, 2019, 7:20 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/07/facebook-facial-recognition-
ice-bad.html [https://perma.cc/6B4H-ZRYN].  Facebook vows that it will not share its 
FRT and has designed its FRT template so that other FRT software cannot use it.  Id.  
However, until it is legally bound to keep its FRT in-house, it is under no legal obligation 
to do so. Political winds may shift in such a way that Facebook decides to share its FRT 
or grant access to its databases to law enforcement or other organizations wishing to exploit 
the technology for gain, politically or otherwise. 
62. Metz, supra note 59. 
63. See id.
 64. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company that Might End Privacy as We Know It, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-
privacy-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/4UM4-3LUC]. 
Until now, technology that readily identifies everyone based on his or her face
has been taboo because of its radical erosion of privacy. Tech companies capable of
releasing such a tool have refrained from doing so; in 2011, Google’s chairman
at the time said it was the one technology the company had held back because it 
could be used “in a very bad way.” 
Id.
 65. See id. Clearview AI developed an app that can find other publicly posted
images of an individual from one provided.  Id. The system includes over three billion 
facial images, taken from sources like “Facebook, YouTube, Venmo, and millions of other 
websites.”  Id.  “[M]ore than 600 law enforcement agencies have started using Clearview 
in the past year.”  Id.  Law enforcement has utilized the “app to help solve shoplifting, 
identity theft, credit card fraud, murder and child sexual exploitation cases.”  Id.  More 
frightening still, Clearview can monitor law enforcement’s use of the app—allowing it to 
look in on who police officers are targeting.  Id.  However, the company has recently been 
named as a defendant in several legal actions, including a class action complaint for 
“collecting, storing and using their and other similarly situated individuals’ biometric 
identifiers and biometric information without informed written consent in direct violation 
of Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA).”  Kirsten Errick, Clearview AI 
Faces Fourth Lawsuit in a Month, LAW ST. (Feb. 14, 2020), https://lawstreetmedia.com/tech/
clearview-ai-faces-fourth-lawsuit-in-a-month/ [https://perma.cc/D34L-CSY4] (quoting 
Class Action Complaint at 1–2, Calderon v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 20-cv-01296, 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020), ECF No. 1). 
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B. Law Enforcement’s Compilation of Biometric Data 
Law enforcement databases are estimated to contain the faces of 117
million Americans, about half of the American adult population.66 The
DHS biometric identification system—the Automated Biometrics 
Identification System or IDENT—contains over 260 million identities and 
processes hundreds of thousands of biometric identifications every day.67 
However, the most significant player in biometrics and facial recognition 
within the law enforcement community is the FBI. 
1. The FBI’s Biometric Identification Data and Systems 
The FBI has a long history of maintaining databases of biometric 
identifiers. Most notably, the FBI assumed management of the national 
fingerprint collection in 1924.68  The FBI developed the collection of
fingerprints into the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
(IAFIS), which became the world’s largest “person-centric” database.69 
The FBI shares fingerprint data with local, federal, and international 
criminal justice agencies.70 
Recently, the FBI developed its Next Generation Identification System 
(NGI).71  NGI boasts the “largest and most efficient electronic repository 
of biometric and criminal history information.”72  This system has two 
components related to FRT. First, the Interstate Photo System (IPS) is the 
FBI’s database of face records; the source of the photos are FBI files and 
“bulk submissions” from state repositories.73 Second, the Facial Recognition 
Search allows law enforcement to search that database to generate 
matches.74 
66. Claire Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle, The Perpetual Line-up:
Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH. (Oct. 
18, 2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org [https://perma.cc/2DMW-2G9P]. 
67. Biometrics, supra note 34. 
68. Fingerprints and Other Biometrics, supra note 20. 
69. Next Generation Identification (NGI), FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/
fingerprints-and-other-biometrics/ngi [https://perma.cc/Q94M-X726].
70. Does the FBI Exchange Fingerprint or Arrest Information with Domestic and 
Foreign Police Agencies?, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about/faqs/does-the-fbi-exchange-
fingerprint-or-arrest-information-with-domestic-and-foreign-police-agencies [https://perma.
cc/PR95-SEXS]. 
71. See Timothy O. Lenz, 21st-Century Developments in Fourth Amendment Privacy
Law, in 1 PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE: 21ST-CENTURY CHALLENGES TO THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 267, 293 (Nancy S. Lind & Erik Rankin eds., 2015).  “The FBI maintains that its 
efforts to develop the [NGI] is driven by technology, customer (that is, police department) 
requirements, and growing demand for [IAFS] services.”  Id. 
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The details of the source of the photos within the IPS are unclear.  The 
FBI maintains separate databases of photos obtained by criminal and civil 
means.75  The criminal database consists of arrest records—at state, local,
and federal levels—and biometric information obtained at crime scenes 
and related to missing or unidentified persons.76  The civil database holds
biometric information obtained from military service records, immigration 
applications, background checks, and licensing applications for many job 
types, required in some states to be a “dentist, accountant, teacher, 
geologist, realtor, lawyer, or optometrist.”77  Civil photos associated with 
individuals in the criminal database are added to that individual’s profile, 
making those civil photos searchable.78  However, the FBI only authorizes 
law enforcement agencies to search the criminal database and refuses 
access to the civil database.79  Nonetheless, the civil photos may find their 
75. Ernest J. Babcock, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Next Generation Identification 
(NGI) Interstate Photo System, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/
foipa/privacy-impact-assessments/interstate-photo-system [https://perma.cc/ZA9F-PSH6].
 76. Jennifer Lynch, Face Off: Law Enforcement Use of Face Recognition Technology, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.eff.org/wp/law-enforcement-use-
face-recognition [https://perma.cc/764U-YV96]. 
77. Id. 
78. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-267, FACE RECOGNITION
TECHNOLOGY: FBI SHOULD BETTER ENSURE PRIVACY AND ACCURACY 11 (2016), https:// 
www.gao.gov/assets/680/677098.pdf [https://perma.cc/YRB9-C5TW]. 
79. Id. at 12 & n.29; see also Babcock, supra note 75.  According to FBI officials, 
the FBI “only allows users to conduct face recognition searches in the criminal identities 
part of the database; no searches are permitted in the civil identities part of the database.”  
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-267, supra note 78, at 12.  However, there is 
another database, the Unsolved Photo File (UPF), that contains photos of subjects of 
criminal investigations with no known identity match.  Babcock, supra note 75.  The addition 
of the UPF is a relatively new addition to the FBI’s databases of faces.  See id.  “[T]he FBI 
concedes that civil photos are searched against the unsolved photo file, where photos of 
unknown perpetrators of ‘felony crimes against persons’ are stored.”  Elizabeth Snyder, 
“Faceprints” and the Fourth Amendment: How the FBI Uses Facial Recognition Technology 
to Conduct Unlawful Searches, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 255, 260 (2018) (citing Babcock,
supra note 75). 
An additional search capability the FBI is exploring for NGI-IPS is the inclusion
of the Unsolved Photo File (UPF). While not enrolled in the civil or criminal
databases, the NGI-IPS Policy and Implementation Guide states that authorized 
law enforcement users, such as states, may place probe photos of an unknown 
individual that is lawfully obtained as part of an authorized criminal investigation of
a felony in a separate part of NGI-IPS, called the unsolved photo file.  However,
as of August 2015, CJIS has not enabled this feature in NGI-IPS. 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-267, supra note 78, at 12 n.29. 
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way into search results through some limited exceptions, loopholes, and 
manipulation of the FBI’s interconnected systems.80 
Another prong of the FBI’s NGI system is its Facial Analysis, Comparison, 
and Evaluation (FACE) Services Unit.81  The FACE unit runs provided
images through FRT software and compares images against databases of 
face photos.82  Notably, FACE does not limit its searches to the NGI-IPS 
database.83  It searches other federal databases, including the Department 
of State’s Visa Photo File, Automated Biometric Identification System, 
and Passport Photo File.84  It also searches state repositories, including
DMV records, mugshots, and correctional photos.85  Federal law authorizes
law enforcement’s access to all of these sources.86 Nonetheless, accessing 
these sources for criminal searches appears to run afoul of the FBI’s standard 
of making its NGI-IPS civil database unsearchable.  This marks a contradiction 
within the FBI’s compartmentalization policy,87 highlighting an issue with 
a self-policing law enforcement agency. 
Furthermore, the FBI’s facial recognition capabilities are far from perfect.
“Simply stated, the most advanced and sophisticated user or facial-
recognition technology could not validate the accuracy of the system.”88 
The system has an 86% rate of correct identification when requesting fifty 
80. The FBI claims that when a UPF search results in a match with a photo in its
civil database, the “response will be suppressed in most instances and the law enforcement 
officer [who submitted the photo to the UPF] will not receive the candidate photo.”  Babcock, 
supra note 75. This policy is vague and contradictory.  It creates privacy concerns and a 
question as to whether the FBI maintains separately administrated databases.  For example, 
if an agent submits a photo to the FBI and the initial search draws no results from the 
known criminal database, the agent could then submit the photo for addition to the UPF.  
The administrator of the UPF would then compare the submitted image to those within the 
civil database.  The FBI claims that it suppresses a response because “searches generally 
do not return civil photos.”  Id.  This contradictory explanation seems to allow the FBI to 
provide identification to the submitting agent if the search returns a match.  The logic is 
circular: the FBI will not return a match if there is no match. 
 81. Facial Recognition Technology: Ensuring Transparency in Government Use: 
Hearing Before the H. Oversight & Reform Comm., 116th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter Hearing]




83. Id.  Notably, most photos searchable by FACE are civil photos.  See Snyder, supra
note 79, at 260. 
84. Hearing, supra note 81 (statement of Kimberly J. Del Greco).
85. Id. 
86. Id.; see also Driver Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 533 & 534; 42 U.S.C. § 3771; 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (2019). 
87. See generally Babcock, supra note 75 (detailing the FBI’s policy on restricting
searches in the civil database). 
88. ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE,
RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 97 (2017). 
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potential matches.89  The FBI has not, however, indicated the rate of false 
positives produced by its system.90  Although a failure to identify a match 
14% of the time is problematic, the potential for incorrect identification 
presents even greater risks. 
The FBI’s internal policies are the agency’s only limitations regarding 
which databases are subject to search.  Self-policing measures open wide 
the potential for privacy invasions; the FBI exacerbates this vulnerability 
by making exceptions to its internal privacy protection policies.91  For
example, the FBI allows law enforcement requests to run FRT searches 
through the FBI’s non-criminal database for certain images when identification 
is problematic.92  The privacy concerns related to tapping into state DMV 
records and other civil databases are readily apparent for all Americans. 
2. State DMV Records
Allowing law enforcement access to DMV records without significant 
hurdles creates privacy concerns for the majority of American adults.  
State DMV databases contain photographs of most American adults,93 and 
Congress has afforded law enforcement almost limitless access to these 
state databases.94  Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia allow
federal agencies to access their driver’s license photo databases.95 The
89. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-579T, FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY:
DOJ AND FBI HAVE TAKEN SOME ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO GAO RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
ENSURE PRIVACY AND ACCURACY, BUT ADDITIONAL WORK REMAINS 14 (2019), https:// 
www.gao.gov/assets/700/699489.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D76-CT8Z] (statement of Gretta 
L. Goodwin, Director Homeland Security & Justice).  Requesting fewer than fifty matches 
results in a lower success rate, because the system might exclude the correct match from 
results. Id. 
90. Id. The report indicates that false positives waste law enforcement time and
resources. Id.  Moreover, the report admits that false positives could result in violations 
of the civil liberties of U.S. citizens.  Id. 
91. See supra notes 79–88 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra note 80. 
93. See I. Wagner, Total Number of Licensed Drivers in the U.S. in 2018, by State, 
STATISTA (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/198029/total-number-of-us-
licensed-drivers-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/G5E4-JGQX] (“In 2018, there were about 227.5
million licensed drivers in the United States.”); see also Our Nation’s Highways: 2011, 
supra note 26. 
94. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (allowing federal law enforcement agents to obtain
information—such as driver’s license photos—from state DMV records). 
95. Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find State Driver’s License Photos Are Gold Mine for 
Facial-Recognition Searches, WASH. POST (July 7, 2019, 12:54 PM), https://www.
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FBI and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have established 
working relationships with state DMV officials to more easily obtain 
access to their license-holders’ information.96  Access is granted without 
formal process, authorization from the state legislature, or the consent of 
the individual driver’s license holder.97  The FBI’s access to these DMV
records has effectively expanded the FBI’s searchable database of faces 
to 641 million photos.98 
Law enforcement typically taps into these databases when it has 
obtained an image of an unidentified suspect.99  When they have a clear
image of a suspect, they are able to ascertain the subject’s identity and 
pursue that lead.100  Law enforcement has used FRT with DMV records 
to solve even low-level offenses, such as stolen checks and petty theft.101 
ICE takes advantage of lax state regulations to gain access to records 
contained in DMV databases.102  Because many states allow undocumented
immigrants to obtain driver’s licenses or driving privilege cards issued by 
the local DMV,103 ICE is able to use these state records to target individuals
washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/07/fbi-ice-find-state-drivers-license-photos-are-
gold-mine-facial-recognition-searches [https://perma.cc/3MGZ-53DA]. 
96. Id.  However, some states have enacted legislation to prevent ICE from getting 
this kind of direct access to state DMV records.  See, e.g., Noelle C. Evans, New State Law 
Safeguards Against ICE Facial Recognition Searches Through DMV Databases, WXXI 
NEWS (July 9, 2019), https://www.wxxinews.org/post/new-state-law-safeguards-against-
ice-facial-recognition-searches-through-dmv-databases [https://perma.cc/5N3D-4G6B]
(discussing New York state’s Green Light Law, also called the Driver’s License Access 
and Privacy Act, which went into effect on December 16, 2019). 
97. Harwell, supra note 95. State DMV officials often grant the FBI access to the 
DMV databases with nothing more than an email.  Id.  From 2011 to mid-2019, the FBI has 
logged more than 390,000 facial recognition searches using state DMV databases.  Hearing, 
supra note 81 (statement of Kimberly J. Del Greco). 
 98. U.S.GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-579T, supra note 89, at 5–6 (statement
of Gretta L. Goodwin, Director Homeland Security & Justice). 
99. See Lynch, supra note 76. 
100. See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How the Police Use Facial Recognition, and 
Where It Falls Short, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/12/ 
technology/facial-recognition-police.html [https://perma.cc/G2HZ-LTE5].  However, when
the images are unclear, FRT has proven ineffective for some departments.  Id. (describing 
FRT as “no magic bullet” because “only a small percentage of [FRT] queries break open 
investigation of unknown subjects”). 
101. Harwell, supra note 95. 
102. See Acacia Coronado, New York Bill Would Grant Undocumented Immigrants 
Driver’s Licenses, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2019, 5:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
new-york-bill-would-grant-undocumented-immigrants-drivers-licenses-11560603600
[https://perma.cc/HG3E-JE6A].
103. See Harwell, supra note 95.  The benefits of licensing undocumented immigrants 
extend to the states and American citizens.  Recurring fees generate millions of dollars in 
revenue.  See Coronado, supra note 102.  Licensing undocumented immigrants also reduces 
the obstacles for obtaining car insurance.  See id.  Combined with the legality of driving, 
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who are illegally in the country.  ICE runs facial recognition searches 
through DMV databases of some of these states.104  Making the voluntarily 
provided information and photographs available to ICE deters immigrants 
from obtaining a driver’s license.105  Moreover, policies that operate as a
bait and switch—offering undocumented immigrants driving privileges 
and then providing their voluntarily provided personal information to 
assist in their deportation—breach the trust of those who, in good faith, 
obtained identification.106 
C. Law Enforcement’s Use of FRT 
1. Current Use of FRT by Law Enforcement Agencies 
State and federal law enforcement agencies use FRT for a variety of
identification purposes. DHS uses biometrics to regulate immigration, 
enforce federal laws, and verify visa applicants.107  The FBI uses FRT to 
ascertain the identity of unknown criminal actors whose images law 
enforcement obtained pursuant to investigations.108  ICE uses FRT to find 
those who have remained in the country illegally.109  Customs and Border
allowing undocumented immigrants to obtain insurance results in fewer hit-and-run accidents.
See id.
 104. Harwell, supra note 95.  Vermont, Utah, and Washington have granted access
to ICE agents, and all three states offer identification to undocumented immigrants.  Id. 
105. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
106. Harwell, supra note 95 (“The state has told [undocumented immigrants], has
encouraged them, to submit that information.  To me, it’s an insane breach of trust to then 
turn around and allow ICE access to that[.]”). 
107. Biometrics, supra note 34.  The House of Representatives Committee on Homeland
Security has expressed concerns regarding the privacy implications of DHS’s use of FRT. 
See About Face: Examining the Department of Homeland Security’s Use of Facial Recognition 
and Other Biometric Technologies: Hearing Before the Comm. on Homeland Sec., 116th
Cong. (2019), https://homeland.house.gov/imo/media/doc/071019BGTOpenStatement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MD8D-4K6R] (statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson).
108. See Lynch, supra note 76. Lynch identifies three reasons for the use of FRT: 
First, a system may be set up to identify an unknown person.  For example, a 
police officer would use this type of system to try to identify an unknown person 
in footage from a surveillance camera.  The second type of face recognition system 
is set up to verify the identity of a known person.  Smartphones rely on this type 
of system to allow you to use face recognition to unlock your phone.  A third 
type, which operates similarly to a verification system, is designed to look for 
multiple specific, previously-identified faces. 
Id.
 109. See Coronado, supra note 102. 
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Protection (CBP) uses it to verify who is entering and exiting the 
country.110  Most law enforcement agencies are using FRT retroactively—
to identify a subject after their image has been captured.111  However, law
enforcement has begun to employ FRT “live” under certain circumstances.112 
CBP has begun to use live FRT in airports and at the border.113  It is the
live application of FRT that previews the extensive potential applications 
of the technology by law enforcement. 
China is implementing a series of FRT measures to track and assess114 
110. See Christopher Reynolds, At Some Airports, Your Face Is Your ID. But Does 
That Put Your Privacy at Risk?, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www. 
latimes.com/travel/story/2019-08-22/facial-recognition-biometrics-at-airports-proliferating 
[https://perma.cc/Q6V4-3JSZ].
111. For an example of how the NYPD used FRT to quickly find the owner of a 
“suspicious appliance” thought to be a bomb in the New York subway system, see Lane 
Brown, There Will Be No Turning Back on Facial Recognition, INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 12, 
2019), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/11/the-future-of-facial-recognition-in-america.html
[https://perma.cc/3CXM-WN27].  Brown also notes several additional current uses of FRT:
(1) by airlines to replace boarding passes; (2) in sports arenas; (3) by Taylor Swift’s 
security to weed out known stalkers; (4) as replacements for key fobs at an apartment complex; 
(5) by schools to recognize suspended students who venture onto school grounds; and 
(6) by retailers to prevent theft and identify known shoplifters. Id. 
112. For example, police may even compel individuals to open their phones—with
facial recognition lock—for search by holding the phone to their face.  For a detailed analysis 
of the Fourth Amendment implications of forcing a suspect to unlock a phone with their 
face compared to requiring a suspect to provide their passcode, see Richard G. Cole III, 
The Constitutional Insecurity of Secured Smartphones: “Unlocking” the Current Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment Safeguards Protecting Secured Smartphones from Law Enforcement 
Searches, 39 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 173, 194–95, 215, 216, 222 (2018). 
113. See Reynolds, supra note 110.
 114. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 111; Zhao, supra note 15.  China is attempting to
build the world’s most powerful facial recognition system.  Stephen Chen, China to Build 
Giant Facial Recognition Database to Identify Any Citizen Within Seconds, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (Oct. 12, 2017, 9:00 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/ 
article/2115094/china-build-giant-facial-recognition-database-identify-any [https://perma.cc/
ZQ4X-559T].  Its goal: identify any of its 1.3 billion citizens within three seconds. Id.
The worst-case scenario for facial recognition might look like something like
China’s forthcoming “social credit system.” When the system is fully operational
next year, the government will use all surveillance methods at its disposal, including
facial recognition and 200 million cameras, to track citizens’ behavior and assign
each of them a social score, which will have a variety of consequences. Infractions
such as jaywalking and buying too many video games could make it harder to
rent an apartment or get a loan from a bank.  That probably isn’t likely in the U.S.,
but a more ordinary kind of surveillance is almost inevitable.
Brown, supra note 111.  The Chinese government is also using FRT to track and control 
a predominantly Muslim minority group within its borders.  Paul Mozur, One Month, 
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its 1.4 billion citizens.115  Facial scanning technology has been implemented 
into sunglasses,116 which law enforcement agencies could couple with 
robust facial databases to make almost every visible person identifiable.117 
“The tool could identify activists at a protest or an attractive stranger on 
the subway, revealing not just their names but where they lived, what they
did and whom they knew.”118  This highlights just one use of FRT that
could have nefarious consequences to privacy and free speech rights.  
Lack of imagination may be the only limit to further development and 
application of FRT.119 
2. Potential Future Implications of FRT’s Use by Law Enforcement 
FRT has been portrayed in science fiction, in various forms, for 
decades.120  Many of these portrayals involved innocuous applications of
the technology that mirror today’s uses, such as unlocking devices and 
making payments.121  However, many others show FRT as a tool of the 
“surveillance state”122 or authoritarian oppressive governments.123  The
115. Population, Total – China, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CN [https://perma.cc/S2P2-LYQS].
116. Zhao, supra note 15. 
117. See Hill, supra note 64. 
118. Id. 
119. Some planned implementations of FRT include: a gas station chain’s plans to
read customers’ age and gender to tailor ads on pump-based screens; an app called Finding 
Rover that uses FRT to reunite lost pets with their owners; an app to identify lost children 
and family members; and as a method of preventing theft by identifying known shoplifters.  
Sandeep Raut, Facial Recognition in the Digital Age, INNOVATION ENTER. (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://channels.theinnovationenterprise.com/articles/facial-recognition-in-digital-age
[https://perma.cc/BPX9-77JM].
120. See Rowena Bonnette, Biometrics in Movies Sci-Fi Security, AVATIER (Jan. 31, 
2017), https://www.avatier.com/blog/biometrics-in-sci-fi-movies/ [https://perma.cc/VD6E-
DH69].
121. See Shaun Raviv, The Secret History of Facial Recognition, WIRED (Jan. 21, 
2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/secret-history-facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/ 
U7U6-7XLG] (“Today, facial recognition has become a security feature of choice for
phones, laptops, passports, and payment apps.  It promises to revolutionize the business of 
targeted advertising and speed the diagnosis of certain illnesses.  It makes tagging friends 
on Instagram a breeze.”).
122. Examples of the “surveillance state” abound in dystopian literature. See, e.g., 
JOHN BRUNNER, THE SHOCKWAVE RIDER (1975); PHILIP K. DICK, THE MINORITY REPORT 
(1987); JOHN TWELVE HAWKS, THE TRAVELER (2005); STANISLAW LEM, MEMOIRS FOUND 
IN A BATHTUB (1961); ORWELL, supra note 11. 
123. See, e.g., ORWELL, supra note 11. 
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creative machinations of some of the writers of such works are merely the 
tip of the iceberg. The telescreen of Nineteen Eighty-Four read emotions 
to identify non-compliant citizens.124  Recently, a Stanford professor used 
FRT and AI to determine the sexual orientation of subjects from an image 
of their face alone.125  Under a justification of protecting the population, 
the government could use FRT to root out undesirable ideologies, putting
democracy at risk. 
But “over-surveillance” could protect law-abiding citizens by deterring 
crime and making the apprehension of wrongdoers easier.126  More than
just catching criminals after they have committed their crimes, FRT could 
be deployed to deter crime in the first place.127  With the explosion of 
surveillance cameras in both public and private settings,128 American 
124. Ferran Esteve, Orwell in Times of Facial Recognition, CCCB LAB (June 18, 
2019), http://lab.cccb.org/en/orwell-in-times-of-facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/HED5-
NAPG].  “The telescreen of 1984 . . . captures the most subtle of sounds and facial expressions. . . . 
[T]hey register everything from an ‘unconscious look of anxiety’ to a nervous tic or even
a rumbling stomach.” Id. 
125. Heather Murphy, Why Stanford Researchers Tried to Create a ‘Gaydar’ Machine, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/science/stanford-
sexual-orientation-study.html [https://perma.cc/JX6D-EFJU].  The release of this study
was very controversial.  See id.  The vast moral implications of FRT able to detect more 
than a person’s identity are troubling.  Scanning that facilitates the discovery of a person’s 
attributes that are more than skin deep further ripens the potential for abuse by those 
in power. When a particular feeling or train of thought becomes associated with illegal 
conduct, the police may use technology to detect those thoughts and feelings to persecute 
those who have them. 
126. For arguments supporting the implementation of FRT by the security industry, 
see generally SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, FACE FACTS: DISPELLING COMMON MYTHS ASSOCIATED 
WITH FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY (2019), https://www.securityindustry.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/facial-recognition-20193.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQ8M-UV8C].
For counterarguments from a leading civil liberties organization, see Hayley Tsukayama 
& Adam Schwartz, Governments Must Face the Facts About Face Surveillance, and Stop 
Using It, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/
02/governments-must-face-facts-about-face-surveillance-and-stop-using-it [https://perma.cc/
XX6P-PBA5].
127. See Nick Coult, Shoplifting Deterrent: Facial Recognition Software, CHAIN 
STORE AGE (June 7, 2018), https://chainstoreage.com/operations/shoplifting-deterrent-facial-
recognition-software [https://perma.cc/29KN-LPFL] (discussing how the deployment of
FRT in stores deters shoplifters).
128. See Liza Lin & Newley Purnell, A World with a Billion Cameras Watching You 
Is Just Around the Corner, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/a-billion-surveillance-cameras-forecast-to-be-watching-within-two-years-115755 
65402 [https://perma.cc/N6JY-YU3X]. The improvements in FRT play a factor in the decisions 
of businesses to add surveillance cameras.  See id.  The integration of technologies, such 
as FRT, into video surveillance provides cross-functionality that is fueling hypergrowth in 
the global video surveillance industry.  See Tim A. Scally, State of the Market: Video 
Surveillance 2019, SDM (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.sdmmag.com/articles/96179-state-
of-the-market-video-surveillance-2019 [https://perma.cc/9BWY-FRNG]. 
166
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citizens are caught on camera more than ever.129  Not all crimes will be
caught by a surveillance camera, and even those that are may not produce 
a facial image that can be recognized even by advanced FRT.130  Nevertheless, 
the possibility of being identified by enhanced FRT by one of the millions 
of cameras positioned throughout the country may reduce crime and help 
to apprehend dangerous perpetrators—something many would regard as 
justification for the widespread adoption of FRT surveillance.131 
Most Americans would likely see a nationwide network of FRT surveillance, 
with its crime deterrent and enforcement effects, as a positive.132  In fact,
a recent study found that more than half of the population trusts law 
enforcement to use FRT responsibly.133  However, those respondents may
129. See Drew Engelbart, Caught on Camera: Americans Are Captured on an Estimated 
70 Security Cameras Each Day, KDVR (Feb. 11, 2018, 1:54 PM), https://kdvr.com/news/ 
trending/caught-on-camera-americans-are-captured-an-estimated-70-security-cameras-
each-day/ [https://perma.cc/ST4Z-L7K5].
130. See Valentino-DeVries, supra note 100. 
131. Video recording serves another benefit to American citizens that has been
highlighted recently by videos depicting police brutality.  See, e.g., Sarah Almukhtar et al., 
Black Lives Upended by Policing: The Raw Videos Sparking Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/19/us/police-videos-race.html 
[https://perma.cc/F3UX-25JC]. None have sparked the reaction quite like the video of a 
Minneapolis police officer kneeling on the neck of George Floyd.  See Evan Hill et al., How 
George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2020), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/7KB8-WELV].
Without videos like the ones showing George Floyd’s last minutes, the calls for change 
and justice would be without the fervor demonstrated in the protests that raged across the 
country. However, videos of police violence are not new; perhaps the most well-known 
example of police violence against a citizen before George Floyd was the video of the 
1991 beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles.  See Anjuli Sastry & Karen Grigsby Bates, 
When LA Erupted in Anger: A Look Back at the Rodney King Riots, NPR (Apr. 26, 2017,
1:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/04/26/524744989/when-la-erupted-in-anger-a-look-
back-at-the-rodney-king-riots [https://perma.cc/57L8-ZKK5].  Unfortunately, the increased 
instances of police “caught-in-the-act” videos has not deterred police misconduct.  The 
officer who killed George Floyd continued his assault despite the obvious presence of people 
recording the entire incident.  See Farhad Manjoo, Cameras Won’t Stop Police from Killing, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/opinion/george-floyd-
video-police.html [https://perma.cc/ZP2S-KZVR]. The officer “ma[de] smirking eye contact
with the camera . . . [and] halfheartedly reache[d] for what look[ed] like pepper spray when the 
phone-wielding bystanders g[o]t a bit rowdy in their insistence that Floyd [wa]s dying before 
their eyes.”  Id. 
132. See Aaron Smith, More Than Half of U.S. Adults Trust Law Enforcement to Use 



















      
 
   
 
 
   
      
   
 
  
have failed to consider the big picture privacy implications of comprehensive 
state sponsored surveillance. Weighing privacy rights against effective 
policing creates a tension, which the law has struggled to address with any
semblance of consistency. 
III. PRIVACY VERSUS EFFECTIVE POLICING
With changes in technology, the role of police, police practices, and the 
culture of policing have changed, blurring the lines drawn in the law and 
weakening the constitutional protections those lines were meant to 
guarantee.134  Technology has enabled police to be more proactive in their 
policing measures.135  However, the potential uses of FRT by law enforcement 
could remove any expectation of privacy when one is in public.136  Although 
over-surveillance and facial recognition may catch “wrongdoers,” it does 
open the door for selective enforcement.137  Those who have access to the
technology would have tremendous power to choose how they use the 
information.138  As Justice Sotomayor warned in her concurring opinion 
in United States v. Jones,139 
I would also consider the appropriateness of entrusting to the Executive, in the
absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, 
especially in light of the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of 
police power and prevent “a too permeating police surveillance.”140 
134. FERGUSON, supra note 88, at 140. 
135. BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 18 (2017). 
Police will likely continue to incorporate surveillance technology into their everyday 
activities. 
In the new policing, departments across the country are ramping up to employ 
automatic license plate readers and [FRT]—and soon enough drones—to be able 
to track us everywhere we go. They are utilizing software to predict where crime
will occur next, and by whom. . . . Policing today is regulatory: it is about 
shaping behavior on the front end, not capturing crooks after the fact—and we 
have all become its targets. 
Id.
 136. FERGUSON, supra note 88, at 140. “We simply have no clear answer to whether 
things like pervasive, high-altitude video surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment.  
Nor has Congress stepped in to provide statutory clarity.”  Id.; see also MARIA HELEN MURPHY, 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE LAW: LANGUAGE, POWER, AND PRIVACY 31 (2019) (noting the lack of 
definitive direction to lower courts and police from the Court in Carpenter).
137. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934,
1935 (2013). 
138. Id. at 1961 (“[W]atchers would have increased power to blackmail, selectively
prosecute, coerce, persuade, and sort individuals.”). 
139.  565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
140. Id. at 416–17 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 
U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
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A world in which an officer could type in a name and see that person’s
movements and actions, even if only to enforce the law, should be 
problematic to everyone.141 
The rampant, unchecked use of FRT by law enforcement exposes all 
Americans to potential abuses by police officers equipped with FRT.  An 
officer who can immediately identify any person on the street could create 
a myriad of more worrisome privacy invasions.142  People should have the 
freedom to maintain some anonymity when outside their home.143  If a
judge would not sign off on a warrant to allow investigators to obtain the 
141.  For example, an officer types a name into their system and can see everywhere 
that person drove—and how fast; they could see where the person parked—and for how 
long; every time that person inadvertently dropped something—the officer would see.  
How many tickets for speeding, parking, and littering could one accumulate in a week?  
What if the officer was that person’s neighbor and they had an ongoing property dispute? 
142. For one, police officers—like all other citizens—are susceptible to poor decision
making.  A jealous officer could use the technology to instantly know intimate details about 
their spouse’s acquaintances, which could lead to inappropriate interactions, or worse.  
However, more problematic would be an officer who is suspicious of a person, potentially 
based on the officer’s biases.  Instead of following that person to determine if there is any 
basis for suspicion, with FRT the officer would instantly know who that person is, where 
they live, and a whole slew of additional information.  The officer might then check in 
regularly on persons that the officer decided were suspicious, which could rise to the level 
of harassment. 
143. Eoin O’Carroll, Face Off? Americans Fear Privacy Loss to Recognition Software, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 20, 2019), https://www.csmonitor.com/Technology/2019/ 
0620/Face-off-Americans-fear-privacy-loss-to-recognition-software [https://perma.cc/
BJF7-ZG2T].  The Supreme Court has also found that anonymity is a protected First 
Amendment right.  See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995). 
Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious,
fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent.
Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.  It thus exemplifies the 
purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to 
protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—
at the hand of an intolerant society.  The right to remain anonymous may be abused
when it shields fraudulent conduct.  But political speech by its nature will
sometimes have unpalatable consequences, and, in general, our society accords
greater weight to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse.
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).  Moreover, “live” FRT could destroy anonymity, which would
redefine how people behave in public space.  Katelyn Ringrose, Essay, Law Enforcement’s
Pairing of Facial Recognition Technology with Body-Worn Cameras Escalates Privacy 
Concerns, 105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 57, 62–63 (2019).  Those who might otherwise be 
critical of law enforcement could be subjected to abusive treatment “[a]nd, based on
current technology, over time these burdens would disproportionately fall on minorities.” 
Id. at 63.
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information FRT would put at law enforcement’s fingertips, the law should
not allow technology to circumvent the warrant system. 
Furthermore, due to the lack of reliability of FRT,144 the potential for 
misidentification could expose the innocent to unwarranted police attention.145 
FRT may render a match that a police officer will act upon without verifying 
146the accuracy of the identification.   This “black box data” is, almost by 
design, unverifiable.147  The speed with which identification occurs combined
with the immediacy to act on the identification makes mistaken identity 
by FRT even more dangerous.148 A 95% match is likely to be good enough 
for most officers to act upon; yet a rate of one false arrest out of twenty is 
a frightening prospect. 
To privacy advocates, FRT implemented as a law enforcement search 
tool creates issues that justify banning the technology altogether.149  Even
the general population—that does not take privacy as seriously as privacy 
advocates150—views personal information obtained for surveillance purposes 
as highly sensitive.151  Unchecked, FRT could have drastic implications
for our freedoms.  As Justice Sotomayor further explained in Jones, 
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and 
expressive freedoms.  And the Government’s unrestrained power to assemble
data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse. . . . [M]aking 
available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate
information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, 
144. See supra notes 44–58 and accompanying text. 
145. See FERGUSON, supra note 88, at 96. 
146. Id. at 97.  When FRT confirms an officer’s preexisting bias, they will be more
emboldened to react strongly.  See Shahram Heshmat, What Is Confirmation Bias?, PSYCH. 
TODAY (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/science-choice/201504/
what-is-confirmation-bias [https://perma.cc/9M7R-N473] (describing that confirmation bias
leads individuals to neglect additional information gathering because evidence supports 
their underlying prejudices). 
147. FERGUSON, supra note 88, at 97.
 148. Id. 
149. See Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, What Happens when Employers Can 
Read Your Facial Expressions?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
10/17/opinion/facial-recognition-ban.html [https://perma.cc/W8JX-RPDG], for the opinion 
from the perspective of two members of the Privacy Project.
150. See Liesbet van Zoonen, Privacy Concerns in Smart Cities, 33 GOV’T INFO. Q.
472, 475 (2016).  A recent survey found that 56% of Americans trust law enforcement 
agencies to use FRT responsibly and 59% support its use to assess security threats in public 
spaces.  Smith, supra note 132.  However, almost three-quarters of those surveyed believed 
FRT could effectively identify individuals with a—perplexingly—slightly lower percentage 
believing FRT could accurately identify a person’s race or gender.  Id.  So, although a 
majority does favor FRT’s use by law enforcement, an even greater majority does not comprehend 
its current shortcomings.  See supra notes 137–48 and accompanying text. 
151. See van Zoonen, supra note 150, at 475. 
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chooses to track—may “alter the relationship between citizen and government in 
a way that is inimical to democratic society.”152 
An outright ban on a developing technology also has an impact on at 
least one of our freedoms—namely, our freedom to innovate.153  Although
rulings on FRT could impact other areas of the law—such as intellectual 
property rights and free speech, when it comes to FRT’s use by law enforcement, 
the Court’s analysis must begin with the Fourth Amendment.154 
In its Fourth Amendment cases, the Court has attempted to balance 
privacy against government power—both with legitimate and important 
considerations.155  The rights of privacy must be weighed against the legitimate 
government powers of fighting crime and protecting national security.156 
The development of new technology combined with the national security 
model of law enforcement will force the judiciary to confront the challenge 
of accommodating change while continuing to uphold the privacy rights 
afforded by the Fourth Amendment.157  The core concept of privacy as a
Fourth Amendment right evolved out of the Court’s broad interpretation 
152. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(quoting United States v. Cuevas–Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J.,
concurring)). 
153. The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the progress of 
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Limiting 
innovation by restricting the use of FRT could impact innovation and reduce the ability of 
Congress to promote scientific progress.  By no means should this drive judicial decision 
making regarding FRT, but it is another example of how the Court’s decisions in one area 
of the law can indirectly affect seemingly unrelated Constitutional rights and mandates. 
154. Any action by law enforcement that could be construed as a search must survive 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  See generally Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a “Search” Within the 
Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing the “two-sided 
inquiry” of Fourth Amendment search analysis defined as “governmental actions [that] 
must invade a protected interest of the individual”). 
155. Lenz, supra note 71, at 272.  However, justices have different conceptions of
privacy, which can be separated into two camps.  Id. at 277. The first is that “privacy 
applies to an act that a person does alone or that has no impact on anyone else.”  Id.  The 
second “is based on the distinction between acts that government has a legitimate interest 
in regulating, which are therefore public, and acts the government does not have a legitimate 
interest in regulating, which are therefore private even if the action involves more than one 
person.”  Id.  This second notion of privacy is more adaptable to the digital age, when “private 
communications” travel through third-party intermediaries and a person’s “personal photo 
album” exists on a third-party’s website.  See id. at 277–78. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 302–03. 
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of the four things—persons, houses, papers, and effects158—specifically 
identified in the Fourth Amendment.159  This reading of the amendment 
interprets the intent of the drafters “to guarantee limited government by 
protecting the right to privacy.”160 
“To protect [privacy] rights, every unjustifiable intrusion by the 
government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means 
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”161 
However, courts may be willing to relax constitutional protections as a 
practical matter when FRT identifies a potential suspect or “bad actor” by 
finding suspicion based on the FRT result alone.162  How intrusive FRT 
becomes is dependent upon what the law allows. 
IV. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK GOVERNING FRT 
Statutory law that directly addresses the use of FRT is sparse.163  In the
United States, some potential uses of FRT have been anticipated and 
158. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  Defining each of the enumerated items has been the 
subject of considerable scholarly debate.  See, e.g., H. Brian Holland, A Cognitive Theory 
of the Third-Party Doctrine and Digital Papers, 91 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 63 (2019) (arguing 
that the digital equivalents of papers should receive Fourth Amendment protection); Alexander 
Porro, Comment, Dwelling in Doubt: Do Tenants Have a Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy in the Common Areas of Their Apartment Buildings?, 2018 U. CHI. L.F. 333, 334 
(arguing that Fourth Amendment rights should be extended to common areas of apartment 
buildings).
159. See Lenz, supra note 71, at 272. 
160. Id. 
161.  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
Although Justice Brandeis was on the losing side of the decision in Olmstead, his dissent 
laid the foundation for the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  See Orin S. 
Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case 
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 839 (2004).  Some scholars have singled out Brandeis’s 
dissent “as a model for how to interpret the Fourth Amendment in light of technological 
change.” Id. at 858 (citing LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 
116 (1999)).  However, Kerr has disagreed with the entire notion of judicial rulemaking in 
the context of technology and the Fourth Amendment.  See id. at 858–59. 
162. See FERGUSON, supra note 88, at 140–41. Combining predictive AI technology
with FRT will only serve to further justify this kind of stop and seizure by police.  Society 
might accept some reduction to privacy rights if the result is not only better law enforcement, 
but statistically supported crime prevention. 
[Q]uestions of probabilistic suspicion will bedevil courts.  Precise algorithms
providing accurate but generalized suspicion will make decision on probable
cause very difficult.  Metadata will provide actionable clues that police will want
to act on in real time.  Courts will have a difficult time saying highly predictive,
pure-probability suspicion is not good enough. 
Id. at 141. There is substantial skepticism regarding the use of big data searches for
preventative policing.  See Lenz, supra note 71, at 279. 
163. See Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional 
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 414–15 (2012) 
172
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addressed by legislation at the state level.164  Illinois addressed the use of 
FRT by private enterprise, primarily aimed at online media companies 
like Facebook and Google.165  New Hampshire bars state agencies from
using FRT in conjunction with its driver’s license photo databases166 and 
body-worn cameras.167  A Vermont law bans law enforcement from equipping 
drones with FRT.168  California is the most recent to take legislative action 
in addressing the use of FRT.  On September 12, 2019, the California 
legislature sent AB 1215 to the governor,169 and on October 7, 2019, 
Governor Gavin Newsom signed it into law.170  The law bans the use of 
FRT incorporated into law enforcement body-worn cameras.171  However, 
it is limited to a duration of three years, and proposed provisions to apply 
the ban to all surveillance cameras were removed before the bill’s 
(noting that despite an increase in federal FRT identification initiatives, Congress has yet to pass 
legislation that directly addresses the use of FRT by law enforcement or by intelligence 
agencies). 
164. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.19 (West 2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 105-D:2, 263:40-b (2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 4622 (2019). 
165. See Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
14/1–/25 (2018) (limiting private enterprise use of “facial geometry”).  See generally In re 
Facebook Biometric Info. Priv. Litig., 326 F.R.D. 535 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (certifying “a class 
consisting of Facebook users located in Illinois for whom Facebook created and stored a 
face template” under the common questions of whether “Facebook’s facial recognition 
technology harvest[ed] biometric identifiers” and whether “Facebook g[a]ve users prior
notice of these practices and obtain[ed] their consent”). 
166. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:40-b. 
167. Id. § 105-D:2.
168. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 4622.  The issue of drone-enhanced policing is another
that needs more consideration by lawmakers.  Experts predicted that the government and 
private companies could launch as many as thirty thousand drones by the early 2020s.  See 
Brown, supra note 33, at 431.  “Equipped with powerful FRT cameras, the drones ‘will be 
capable of capturing minute details, including every mundane action performed by every 
person in an entire city simultaneously.’”  Id. (quoting John W. Whitehead, Smile, the 
Government Is Watching: Next Generation Identification, RIGHT SIDE NEWS (Sept. 17, 
2012, 12:07 PM), http://www.rightsidenews.com/2012091717049/editorial/us-opinion-
and-editorial/smile-the-government-is-watching-next-generation-identification.html 
[https://perma.cc/A9A2-YET2]).
169. Rachel Metz, California Lawmakers Ban Facial-Recognition Software from 
Police Body Cams, CNN (Sept. 13, 2019, 8:04 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/12/tech/ 
california-body-cam-facial-recognition-ban/index.html [https://perma.cc/YE8K-YN5X]. 
170.  Evan Symon, Governor Newsom Signs Bill Banning Facial Recognition Technology 
in Police Body Cameras, CAL. GLOBE (Oct. 9, 2019, 8:53 PM), https://californiaglobe.com/
section-2/governor-newsom-signs-bill-banning-facial-recognition-technology-in-police-
body-cameras [https://perma.cc/ARK7-ZKQG]; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.19 (West 2020). 
171. See PENAL § 832.19(b). 
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passage.172  Other laws control aspects of FRT’s implementation, without 
any cognizance of the implications it would have on FRT.173  None of   
these laws are broad enough to relieve privacy concerns.174  However, 
some federal law provides alternative justification for governmental use 
of FRT outside the law enforcement context. 
28 U.S.C. § 534 expressly requires the Attorney General to acquire, 
preserve, and exchange identification information.175  The statutory scheme 
creating the FBI provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall” obtain 
information related to “criminal identification [and] crime,” identifying 
deceased individuals, and locating missing persons.176  The statute also 
requires that the Attorney General share those records with other federal 
agencies, state agencies, cities, and “penal and other institutions.”177 The
statute further provides the Attorney General—who assigned this responsibility 
to the FBI—broad discretion in how to comply178 and few legal limitations 
to the collection of biometric information.179  Many scholarly works have
advocated for the amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 534 to address privacy 
concerns.180 However, this Comment advocates for a more thorough
overhaul of § 534 and creation of a new statutory provision to address the 
legitimate government interests in identifying the deceased and locating 
the missing.
Other statutes aim at assisting law enforcement in identifying people. 
Many states adopted “stop and identify” statutes by the mid-1970s requiring 
suspicious persons to identify themselves when asked by police.181 
“[S]top and identify laws exist in 24 states.”182  The Court has struck down 
172. Id. § 832.19(e); Law Enforcement: Facial Recognition and Other Biometric 
Surveillance: Hearing on A.B. 1215 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Pub. Safety, 2019-2020 
Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (statement of Nikki Moore, Couns., Cal. State Assemb. Comm. on 
Pub. Safety); Metz, supra note 169. 
173. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (allowing federal law enforcement agents to obtain
information—such as driver’s license photos—from state DMV records); 28 U.S.C. § 534 
(requiring the Attorney General to gather and disseminate information related to crime and 
identification). 
174. See supra Part III. 
175. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (governing the “[a]cquisition, preservation, and exchange of
identification records and information; appointment of officials”). 
176. Id. § 534(a)(1)–(3). 
177. Id. § 534(a)(4). 
178. See Christopher DeLillo, Open Face: Striking the Balance Between Privacy and
Security with the FBI’s Next Generation Identification System, 41 NOTRE DAME J. LEGIS. 
264, 266 (2015). 
179. See Angelica Carrero, Biometrics and Federal Databases: Could You Be in It?, 
51 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 589, 601 (2018). 
180. See, e.g., DeLillo, supra note 178, at 266; Snyder, supra note 79, at 274. 
181. See Jonathan Weinberg, Proving Identity, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 731, 780 (2017). 
182. Charles Montado, Do I Have to Show the Police My ID?, THOUGHTCO. (Nov.
2, 2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/show-the-police-my-id-970889 [https://perma.cc/ 
174
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some aspects of these laws, iterating that the statutes cannot be vague and 
must require reasonable suspicion.183  In a typical interaction, though,
these concerns are not at issue because most people, when asked for
identification by a police officer, will comply without resistance.184 
However, if a person declines the officer’s request, the officer cannot 
demand the citizen’s identification without reasonable suspicion.185 FRT
CL4P-7UCG].  The states that have stop and identify laws are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri (Kansas 
City only), Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin.  Id. 
183. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983) (striking down
California’s “stop and identify” statute for vagueness); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 
(1979) (striking down a Texas “stop and identify” statute because it lacked a reasonable 
suspicion component).  But see Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 188 
(2004) (“A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry 
stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”).
184. See Desiree Phair, Searching for the Appropriate Standard: Stops, Seizure, and
the Reasonable Person’s Willingness to Walk Away from the Police, 92 WASH. L. REV. 
425, 442 (2017). 
Previous studies have demonstrated that civilians rarely feel free to ignore authority
figures. Researchers have conducted a number of queries examining subjects’
actions when commanded by an official, responses to requests from those in
uniform, behavior adaptions when warned in advance of rights, and willingness 
to interact with police[.] Electric shock experiments and experiments testing 
laypersons’ reaction to those in uniform show that most people comply with
requests from authority figures.  Studies covering warnings’ effect on voluntary
consent further support that civilians tend to acquiesce.  Finally, a thorough study
testing willingness to refuse police indicates laypersons’ discomfort with avoiding
officers. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).
185. See Margaret Raymond, The Right to Refuse and the Obligation to Comply:
Challenging the Gamesmanship Model of Criminal Procedure, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1483, 
1501 (2007).  Professor Raymond goes on to note the practical implications of refusing to 
comply with an officer’s request for identification. 
There is another gamesmanship component to the consensual encounter standard. 
While the standard presumes that a reasonable person knows when he is free to
decline an officer’s requests, as a legal matter that freedom turns, in part, on the 
officer’s level of suspicion.  If the officer’s observations do not amount to reasonable
suspicion, then the individual is free to decline the encounter.  On the other hand,
if the officer has reasonable suspicion, he has the authority to subject the 
individual to a stop and to require compliance if the individual refuses.  But the 
individual, even assuming he understands the governing legal principles, has no
way of knowing how much suspicion the officer has.  Walking away may be
constitutionally protected, or it may be a criminal act; which it is may prove to 
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cuts out the request and consensual aspect of the equation, jumping directly 
to the identification step without gaining consent or having reasonable 
suspicion.186 
Another area that has been explored by academia and addressed by 
some state legislative action is the implementation of FRT into body-worn 
cameras (BWCs).187  There has been significant public outcry calling for 
the required use of BWCs by police officers, and its implementation has 
been largely considered a positive development in policing practices.188 
However, incorporating FRT into BWCs presents a myriad of potential 
constitutional issues and negative effects.189  In a First Amendment context, 
FRT may deter people from attending public protests, rallies, or other 
political gatherings knowing that their identity would be instantly known 
to law enforcement equipped with FRT enabled BWCs.190 
be a roll of the dice.  At least in some circumstances, the suspect needs not only 
to be reasonable about the legality of the officer’s actions, but to be right. 
Id. at 1501–02 (footnotes omitted) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-08-02 (1997)). 
186. Congress could mitigate the reasonable suspicion issue with legislation that
requires law enforcement to manually operate any FRT search systems.  Instead of having 
FRT actively scanning faces like license plate scanners, see POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., supra 
note 17, at 28–34; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text, officers operating 
a vehicle or monitoring a camera feed could control when an FRT system runs a search.  
This potential solution presents problems on both sides of the issue.  From the perspective 
of law enforcement, this would seem to be a gross underutilization of the technology.  
Nonetheless, from those advocating for privacy protections and against overbearing police 
search tactics, such a limitation would be ripe for exploitation and nearly impossible 
to oversee.  In a certain sense, such a compromise is an attractive option.  However, in 
application, limiting technological advancement does not achieve an optimal result. Also, 
the ease with which an officer could initiate an FRT search—by pushing a button—decreases 
the inherent barriers to initiating a traditional search—conducting a stop, engaging with 
the individual, and requesting identification—increases the likelihood of abuse.  See generally 
Wouter Kool et al., Decision Making and the Avoidance of Cognitive Demand, 139 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 665 (2010).  Congress should enact legislation that allows 
for technology’s implementation without tempting unconstitutional behavior.  See infra 
Part VI. 
187. See, e.g., Ringrose, supra note 143; Wouter Zwart, Slow Your Roll Out of Body-
Worn Cameras: Privacy Concerns and the Tension Between Transparency and Surveillance in 
Arizona, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 783, 788 (2018). 
188. Kelly Blount, Body Worn Cameras with Facial Recognition Technology: When
It Constitutes a Search, CRIM. L. PRAC., Fall 2017, at 61, 61. 
189. Ringrose, supra note 143, at 62; see also supra notes 20, 24 and accompanying 
text.  The negative effects of BWCs with FRT “include, but are not limited to, disparities 
in how the technology treats African Americans, chilling free speech, and vulnerability to 
third-party hacking and misuse of data.” Ringrose, supra note 143, at 62. 
190. See generally Julian R. Murphy, Chilling: The Constitutional Implications of
Body-Worn Cameras and Facial Recognition Technology at Public Protests, 75 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2018) (arguing against incorporating FRT into BWCs, especially 
in the context of political protests, due to the likely chilling effect on freedom of speech). 
176
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Other laws have targeted FRT’s commercial uses by non-government 
entities.191  These laws sparked an explosion of litigation,192 which may 
eventually provide valuable insight into how the courts view FRT outside 
the law enforcement context.  However, the states with these laws have 
made them applicable to non-public entities only.193  More comprehensive
legislation is necessary to appropriately check law enforcement’s use of 
FRT. This Comment insists that Congress must act to interrupt law 
enforcement’s use of FRT to protect the privacy rights of Americans 
because the judiciary is unlikely to bar FRT’s use or act quickly enough 
to prevent unprecedented privacy intrusions. 
V. THE SUPREME COURT’S FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH DOCTRINE
The legality of law enforcement’s use of FRT must begin by determining
whether the use of FRT constitutes a search.  All search analyses begin
with the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.194 
The two clauses of the Fourth Amendment deserve special attention. 
The first—the “reasonableness clause”—requires that searches and seizures 
be “reasonable”; the second—the “warrant clause”—explains what is
required to obtain a warrant.195  This distinction is important here because
191. See, e.g., Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 14/10 (2019).  This law has already been the subject of recent litigation.  See In re 
Facebook Biometric Info. Priv. Litig., 326 F.R.D. 535, 535–36 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
192.  Charles N. Insler, Understanding the Biometric Information Privacy Act Litigation 
Explosion, ILL. B.J., Mar. 2018, at 34, 35–36; see, e.g., In re Facebook Biometric Info. Priv. 
Litig., 326 F.R.D. at 535; Rivera v. Google Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Gullen 
v. Facebook.com, Inc., No. 15-cv-7681, 2016 WL 245910 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2016). 
193. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10.  The Illinois statute only applies to “private
entities,” defined as “any individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, 
association, or other group, however organized.  A private entity does not include a State 
or local government agency.  A private entity does not include any court of Illinois, a clerk 
of the court, or a judge or justice thereof.”  Id. 
194. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
195. See Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment’s Two Clauses, 26 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1389, 1389–90 (1988–1989). The first iteration of what became the Fourth
Amendment, written by James Madison, related these clauses to one another in the context 
of barring general warrants.  Id. at 1391.  The original wording was: 
 177
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this Comment explores the legal framework of warrantless FRT use,
analyzing whether that use constitutes a search.196 
Early case law involving the Fourth Amendment searches is sparse,
mostly because criminal prosecutions were in state courts—in which the 
Fourth Amendment did not apply prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—and law enforcement was conducted by state or locally run 
agencies.197  Until the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the protections
under the Fourth Amendment were only applied to federal law enforcement 
agencies, very few of which existed before the twentieth century.198 
In the twentieth century, the Court developed its Fourth Amendment 
doctrine.199   The Court has established two approaches to Fourth
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, their houses, their papers, and 
their other property, from all unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated
by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not
particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized. 
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
196. Under the proposed solution of this Comment, see infra Part VI, law enforcement 
would be free to seek a warrant to use FRT to find or identify a suspect.  Although this Comment 
analyzes only warrantless FRT use, a warrant resolves many of the issues identified herein.  
A warrant must “particularly describ[e] the . . . things to be seized.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
Thus, a warrant resolves the issue of widely deployed FRT that scans and identifies every 
person’s face or scans particular faces on an officer’s whim.  If law enforcement obtains 
a warrant to get images contained on social media, there is no inappropriate invasion of privacy. 
197.  Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 547, 613 (1999); David E. Steinberg, The Uses and Misuses of Fourth Amendment 
History, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581, 586–87 (2008).  Prior to United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 
616 (1886), “constitutional search-and-seizure provisions probably were mentioned in fewer 
than fifty cases.”  Steinberg, supra, at 586.  Although most state constitutions during the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century contained search and seizure provisions similar to 
the language of the Fourth Amendment, published state court opinions rarely referenced 
these provisions. Id. at 587.  Instead, courts often treated search and seizure related claims 
as common law trespass or civil law forfeiture actions.  Fabio Arcila, Jr., A Response to 
Professor Steinberg’s Fourth Amendment Chutzpah, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1229, 1251 (2008). 
198. See Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 
SUP. CT. REV. 67, 77 & n.41 (2013); see also, e.g., A Brief History, FBI, https://www.fbi.
gov/history/brief-history [https://perma.cc/2LSR-GXJE] (describing the formation of the 
FBI in 1908).
199. In the late nineteenth century, the Court did take on two cases that established 
the foundation from which the Court built its Fourth Amendment doctrine.  See Boyd, 116 
U.S. 616; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).  In Ex parte Jackson, the Court held that
the Fourth Amendment barred government officials from opening letters and packages 
transported by the U.S. Postal Service.  96 U.S. at 733. In Boyd, the Court noted the close 
relationship between the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches 
and the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination.  116 U.S. at 633–35.  The Court 
construed the Fourth Amendment liberally and held that complying with a federal law requiring 
disclosure of documents was equivalent to a search.  Id. at 634–35. 
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Amendment questions: trespass and privacy.200 
A. Fourth Amendment Trespass Doctrine 
In the 1920s, the Court began to evaluate Fourth Amendment issues as 
trespasses.201  In Olmstead v. United States,202 the Court departed from the 
liberal application of Fourth Amendment rights.  The Court found that 
Fourth Amendment protections applied if “there has been an official 
search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers or his 
tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or 
curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.”203  This rule became
known as the “trespass test” and controlled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
throughout the early twentieth century.204 However, after establishing the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test in Katz v. United States,205 the
Court relegated trespass to one factor in the privacy analysis.206 
In the twenty-first century, the Court—in a slew of decisions— 
reestablished the trespass view of the Fourth Amendment.207  The seminal 
case restoring the trespass approach is United States v. Jones, in which the 
200. David Steinberg, Florida v. Jardines: Privacy, Trespass, and the Fourth Amendment, 
23 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 91, 97 (2013) (“[N]either privacy analysis nor trespass analysis 
has yielded a coherent body of Fourth Amendment doctrine.”). 
201. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928); Hester v. United 
States, 265 U.S. 57, 58–59 (1924). 
202.  277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
203. Id. at 466.  The Court ruled that a wiretap of a building’s phone lines was not a 
“search” or a “seizure” because law enforcement never entered the building to effectuate 
the wiretap.  Id. 
 204. See Richard Sobel, Barry Horwitz & Gerald Jenkins, The Fourth Amendment 
Beyond Katz, Kyllo and Jones: Reinstating Justifiable Reliance as a More Secure 
Constitutional Standard for Privacy, 22 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 9 (2013).  Notably, Justice 
Brandeis, in dissent, described the future focus of Supreme Court Fourth Amendment 
decisional rationale: privacy.  See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475–78 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
Before ascending to the Court, Brandeis along with Samuel Warren argued that “a person 
has the ‘right to be let alone’” in an 1890 article in the Harvard Law Review. Meghan E. 
Leonard, The Changing Expectation of Privacy in the Digital Age, in 1 PRIVACY IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE: 21ST-CENTURY CHALLENGES TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 307, 308 (Nancy 
S. Lind & Erik Rankin eds., 2015) (quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890)). 
205.  389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
206. Steinberg, supra note 200, at 107. 
207. See id. at 107–09. 
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late Justice Scalia penned the majority opinion.208  The Jones search 
analysis notes that “[a] trespass on ‘houses’ or ‘effects,’ or a Katz invasion 
of privacy, is not alone a search unless it is done to obtain information; 
and the obtaining of information is not alone a search unless it is achieved 
by such a trespass or invasion of privacy.”209  However, when the Court 
applied the Jones test in Florida v. Jardines210—another opinion written 
by Justice Scalia—the word “trespass” was noticeably absent.211  Nonetheless, 
Justice Scalia is credited with returning the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
approach to its traditional roots, which has gained significant support 
within the academic community.212 
However, at least one scholar has challenged the notion that the Court 
has traditionally required trespass as a precursor to finding a Fourth 
Amendment violation.213  Orin Kerr noted that early Fourth Amendment
cases varied widely in methodology, weighing “a mix of property, privacy, 
and policy concerns.”214  Further, the Founding Fathers drafted many
provisions of the Bill of Rights to protect the rights of suspects and 
convicted offenders because they had “experienced the political use of the 
criminal law powers during the colonial era.”215 
Applying the Jones test to FRT as a search tool requires determining 
whether the technology intrudes physically upon the “person.”216  Looking
208. 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012); see also Sara M. Corradi, Be Reasonable! Limit
Warrantless Smart Phone Searches to Gant’s Justification for Searches Incident to Arrest, 
63 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 943, 954 (2013). 
209. Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 n.5. 
210.  569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013). 
211. Orin Kerr, What is the State of the Jones Trespass Test After Florida v. Jardines?, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 27, 2013, 2:56 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/03/27/what-is-
the-state-of-the-jones-trespass-test-after-florida-v-jardines [https://perma.cc/Z979-DCRX].
212. See Sobel, Horwitz & Jenkins, supra note 204, at 8–9 (noting that the Supreme 
Court applied a Fourth Amendment property-based test: “a government-sponsored physical 
trespass on or of tangible property constituted a Fourth Amendment violation”). 
213. Kerr, supra note 198, at 68–69. 
214. Id. at 69. Professor Kerr traces the mistaken “common wisdom” that pre-Katz 
search doctrine was based on trespass law to two cases from 1967: Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294 (1967), and Katz itself.  Kerr, supra note 198, at 68–69. “Both cases wrongly claimed 
that prior law had adopted a trespass standard.  Later commentators assumed these claims 
to be true, cementing the trespass narrative for pre-Katz search doctrine.”  Id. at 69. Several 
nineteenth and early twentieth century cases demonstrate that “early Supreme Court search 
doctrine was not tied to property law.”  Id. at 77–79 (referencing Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616 (1886), Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), Perlman v. United States, 247 
U.S. 7 (1906), and United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927)).
215. Lenz, supra note 71, at 282.
 216. See Kerr, supra note 211. Under one interpretation, the Jones test acts 
to “protect[] private property from physical intrusion.”  Id.  While Professor Kerr notes 
that the Jones Court relied on the text of the Fourth Amendment explicitly to extend its 
protections to “private property,” see id., this Comment posits that the same analysis should 
yield similar protections to the “person.” 
180
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first to the scan, FRT has no physical interaction with its subject.  It need 
not touch a person or invade upon their personal space.  The logic applied 
by Olmstead was that tapping the phones did not require intrusion into the 
building, and therefore was not a “trespass” by the government that 
evoked Fourth Amendment protections.217  Because Jones revived the
trespass rationale iterated in Olmstead, it must be noted that FRT scans do 
not fall within the common law’s trespass doctrine. Evaluating the
databases yields the same result under the Jones test. There is no physical
intrusion because the acquisition of data requires no physical contact; 
instead, data is acquired electronically.218  What is more, the electronic
intrusion does not involve property owned by the target; instead, the data 
resides on servers owned by the agency or company from which the photo 
was mined to assemble the database.219 
Lower courts have narrowly interpreted Jones as applying only to cases 
of physical intrusion.220  So, that provides a definitive result: FRT as a
search tool does not violate traditional notions of trespass, neither by the 
facial scan nor in its assembly of face databases.  “Where a search does not 
involve a physical trespass, the court applies the analysis used in Katz.”221 
B. Katz’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
The privacy view of Fourth Amendment protection was fully adopted
by the Court in the 1960s.222  The Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis
217.  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
218. However, the Court applies different analysis to digital-age questions. See infra
Sections V.B.2 & V.B.3. 
 219. See, e.g., Krish Bandaru & Kestutis Patiejunas, Under the Hood: Facebook’s 
Cold Storage System, FACEBOOK (May 14, 2015), https://engineering.fb.com/core-data/
under-the-hood-facebook-s-cold-storage-system [https://perma.cc/H4DF-86W7] (explaining
Facebook’s innovate approach to data storage to accommodate the more than two billion 
photos that are shared via the social media site every day); David Mortenson, 2017 Year 
in Review: Date Centers, FACEBOOK (Dec. 11, 2017), https://engineering.fb.com/data-center-
engineering/2017-year-in-review-data-centers [https://perma.cc/6PY7-PCQ6] (noting that
Facebook added four new data centers in 2017 to the eleven already existing across the 
globe).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 513–14 (11th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Rogers, 71 F. Supp. 3d 745, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2014), aff’d, 901 F.3d 846 (7th Cir. 
2018).
221. United States v. Alvarez, No. 14-cr-00120-EMC, 2016 WL 3163005, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. June 3, 2016) (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012)).
222. See Ber-An Pan, Comment, The Evolving Fourth Amendment: United States v.
Jones, the Information Cloud, and the Right to Exclude, 72 MD. L. REV. 997, 1003 (2013).  
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shifted away from property rights223 and focused on a reasonable expectation 
of privacy test.224 Katz v. United States225 is the seminal case interpreting 
the protection against warrantless searches provided by the Constitution.226 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz, adopted by the Court in Smith v. 
Maryland,227 laid out a two-part test: “first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation 
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”228  Application of
the test has typically consisted of only applying the second, objective prong, 
asking whether an expectation of privacy and protection against warrantless 
searches is societally reasonable.229 
The Warren Court of the 1960s was known as a policymaking court, especially in the area 
of criminal justice. See Lenz, supra note 71, at 271.  The Warren Court did not decide
cases narrowly, instead making broad policy rulings with “a clear preference for the due
process model of justice.”  Id.  The Burger and Rehnquist Courts that followed moved the 
Court in a conservative direction. Id. While the Roberts Court has followed the broad 
policymaking approach of the Warren Court, “its rulings reflect the values and policies 
associated with the crime control model of justice” that is more deferential to police and 
prosecutors, supporting executive discretion. Id. 
223. Martin McKown, Fifty Years of Katz: A Look Back—and Forward—at the 
Influence of Justice Harlan’s Concurring Opinion on the Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 140, 142 (2017). 
In a single footnote, Justice Harlan also declared that the Court’s decision 
effectively overruled the property-based approach in Olmstead.  This was a significant 
proposition because, in his own words, the Olmstead decision “essentially rested
on the ground that conversations were not subject to the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment.” The footnote served to emphasize the notion that, like his colleagues
in the majority, Justice Harlan believed the Fourth Amendment extends beyond
physical intrusions to protect conversations that were expected to be safe from
the uninvited ear, even when made in a public place like a telephone booth.
Id. at 143–44 (footnotes omitted) (citing and quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
361, 362 n.* (1967)). 
224. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 359. 
225.  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
226. Charles E. MacLean, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof: The Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy Doctrine is Rudderless in the Digital Age, Unless Congress Continually Resets 
the Privacy Bar, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 47, 55 (2014); McKown, supra note 223, at 140; 
Matthew M. Meacham, The Perfect Storm How Narrowing of the State Action Doctrine, 
Inconsistency in Fourth Amendment Caselaw, and Advancing Security Technologies 
Converge to Erode Our Privacy Rights, 55 IDAHO L. REV. 309, 321 (2019). 
227.  442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
228. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
229. Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 
82 U. CHI. L. REV.113, 114–16 (2015).  Although courts often contend that they are applying 
both the subjective and objective prongs of the Katz analysis, courts overwhelmingly rely 
upon the objective prong, even in the two percent of decisions that claim to apply subjective 
analysis exclusively.  Id. at 117, 120–21. 
182
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Courts have struggled to define a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” 
as this concept is dynamic and subjective.230  Balancing privacy interests 
of individuals against the reasonableness of law enforcement’s tactics231 
and police efficiency has led to perplexing decisions.232  The bulk of
rulings boil down to an unhelpful maxim: “it depends.”  In determining
whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable, the courts examine the 
totality of the circumstances.233  Certain classes of people have a reduced
230. Lenz, supra note 71, at 270. The reasonableness requirement is malleable in
that “it changes with the times” and “its meaning is relative in the sense that it is based on 
personal expectations.”  Id.  Thus, public opinion plays a major role in the Supreme Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  See id.  The changing expectations of privacy make it 
difficult for courts to keep pace.  More critically, the idea of an evolving concept of privacy 
rights—especially when the Constitution does not explicitly mention privacy—rings of 
“living constitutionalism,” a concept that makes devoted originalists cringe.  See generally 
Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved Common-Law 
Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process Of Law”—“Fourth Amendment 
Reasonableness” Is Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51 
(2010) (arguing against the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test from an originalist 
perspective).  “The historical record shows that the Framers did not write the Fourth 
Amendment to control criminal arrest and search standards; rather, the primary aim for 
that Amendment was to prohibit the use of general warrants for revenue searches of houses 
for untaxed goods.”  Id. at 56. 
231. Although technology enhanced policing has resulted in increased safety and less
policy-citizen violence, press coverage regarding new enhancements has generally focused on 
negative implications.  See Bryce Clayton Newell, Local Law Enforcement Jumps on the 
Big Data Bandwagon: Automated License Plate Recognition Systems, Information Privacy, 
and Access to Government Information, 66 ME. L. REV. 397, 398–99 (2014).  However, 
“less attention has been given to balancing these privacy interests with the important 
societal interest in promoting effective and efficient police work.  The tensions between 
these competing, equally legitimate aims is substantial.” Id. at 399. 
232. See, e.g., Heather Baxter, Right Result, Wrong Reason: Why the Intent Requirement
in Florida v. Jardines Trespasses on the Clarity of the Fourth Amendment, 51 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 217, 230 (2019) (noting that the result in Florida v. Jardines was surprising).  Justice
Sotomayor, in her concurring opinion in Jones, spelled out the implications on privacy 
of long-term GPS monitoring: 
I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be 
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain,
more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on. 
I do not regard as dispositive the fact that the Government might obtain the fruits 
of GPS monitoring through lawful conventional surveillance techniques. 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
233. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). 
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expectation of privacy, given their particular environments.234  A person’s
locale at the time of the search weighs heavily in determining whether an 
expectation of privacy was reasonable.235  Although defining what constitutes 
a societally acceptable reasonable expectation of privacy is generally 
impossible, the Court has established several doctrines and revealed 
certain analytical tendencies that provide some guidance to lower courts 
and law enforcement. 
1. Unprotected Faces: Public Exposure Doctrine 
“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home 
or office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection.”236  Thus, law
enforcement’s observations of anything put on public display are not 
“searches” at all.237  This rationale naturally leads to the conclusion that a
person’s uncovered face has no privacy protections, but the Court did not 
leave this to mere conjecture.  In United States v. Dionisio, the Court, in 
dicta, explained that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy of 
their face.238  No one would find it reasonable to preclude a police officer 
from looking at faces of people on the street nor would anyone bar that 
234. See, e.g., Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 (parolees); Knights, 534 U.S. at 119–20 
(probationers); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656–57 (1995) (student-
athletes); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525–26 (1984) (prisoners). 
235. See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Decentralizing Fourth Amendment Search
Doctrine, 107 KY. L.J. 169, 179 (2018) (citing United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303–
04 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179–81 (1984)).  The Fourth Amendment 
expressly protects citizens’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects” from unreasonable warrantless 
searches.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  Houses may include hotel rooms, apartments, automobiles, 
occupied taxis, and business offices.  See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143–44 (1962) 
(finding that a prison cell did not share the attributes of a “house” under the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment because official surveillance was the traditional norm but identifying 
the listed places as being included as “houses” in other cases).  However, outside the home, 
the constrictions on law enforcement searches vanish almost entirely, even if police look 
into areas close to the home.  See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–52 (1989) 
(fenced area visible by air from helicopter not protected by Fourth Amendment); California v. 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (no reasonable expectation of privacy of one’s trash); 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986) (fenced area visible from air by airplane not 
protected by Fourth Amendment). 
236.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
237.  United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973). 
238. Id. The Court in Dionisio found that the Fourth Amendment did not protect 
from discovery a defendant’s voice.  Id.  The Court analogized a person’s voice to their face, 
noting that 
Like a man’s facial characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly
produced for others to hear.  No person can have a reasonable expectation that
others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably
expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.
Id.
184
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officer from approaching people they recognized as known or suspected 
criminals.239 
Moreover, in a recent civil case, one U.S. district court judge applied
the public exposure rationale to FRT. In Rivera v. Google, Inc., a plaintiff 
attempted to differentiate a face, which it admitted was not “private,” from 
the biometric information of the face, which it contended deserved 
privacy protections.240 The court rejected that argument, holding that 
because the biometric face template was created from “otherwise public 
information,” it was not private.241 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has expressed that “[a] person does not 
surrender all Fourth Amendment protections by venturing into the public 
sphere.”242  While the Court has not defined the limits of the exception to
the public exposure doctrine, it has repeatedly deferred to what law 
enforcement would have been able to learn about a suspect without 
a warrant at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s drafting.243  A person’s
exposed face would seem to fall within that category, and, therefore, the 
FRT scan would not constitute a search.  More importantly, if taken at face 
value, the public exposure doctrine would likely extend to photographs 
shared with the public—on social media, for example.  Moreover, the 
third-party doctrine could expose any information shared with a third 
239. Courts have consistently treated a face as having no privacy protections under 
the Fourth Amendment.  See id.; see also In re Melvin, 550 F.2d 674, 676 (1st Cir. 1977) 
(“[I]t seems clear that one has no more reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s face 
than in one’s voice, and that being forced to stand in a lineup does not result in an 
unconstitutional ‘seizure’.”); United States v. Anthony, No. 4:18-CR-00012, 2019 WL 
471984, at *3 (W.D. Va. Feb. 5, 2019) (“The court holds that defendants have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy to their heads, faces, necks, arms, and hands.”). 
240.  366 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
241. Id. 
242. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).  The Carpenter Court 
acknowledged that “what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to 
the public, may be constitutionally protected.”  Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 351–52 (1967)). 
243. See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2217; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403
(2014); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring); Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) 
(“The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable 
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests 
as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.”). 
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party—even companies that store photos hidden from public view244— 
reachable without a warrant. 
2. Third-Party Doctrine
The third-party doctrine intimates that any information shared with a 
third-party is obtainable by government agents without a warrant.245  The 
Court created the third-party doctrine in Miller v. United States246 and 
reinforced it three years later in Smith v. Maryland.247  The third-party 
doctrine provided a clear, bright-line rule within the otherwise murky 
waters left by Katz: information possessed by a third party is not private 
and has no Fourth Amendment protection.248  Although the doctrine was
a blunt instrument that failed to “acknowledge gradations in the sensitivity 
of information citizens disclose to others” in modern times,249 it remained
fully in force for over forty years until the Court delivered its holding in 
Carpenter v. United States.250 
In Carpenter, the Court surprised legal scholars by departing from the
third-party doctrine.251  “[T]he majority emphatically rejected the
government’s argument that people lose their privacy rights when using 
244. For example, not all photographs on social media are public. See, e.g., Brian 
Barrett, The Complete Guide to Facebook Privacy, WIRED (Mar. 21, 2018, 1:10 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-privacy-apps-ads-friends-delete-account [https:// 
perma.cc/5RKY-YKFP].  Some are set to private or restricted to friends-only viewing.  
See id.  Some users keep information on third-party servers for storage purposes only.  See, 
e.g., DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/out-of-space?oqa=wb_oq_rd_hm [https://perma.cc/ 
9D4E-VRVG].
245.  United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even 
if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a 
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. 
Id.  For a detailed discussion of the third-party doctrine, see generally Orin S. Kerr, The
Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009). 
246. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). In Miller, the defendant objected to the use of his bank 
records against him, but the Court ruled “that a person has no ‘legitimate expectation 
of privacy’ in information he or she voluntarily provides to third parties.” MURPHY, supra
note 136, at 27 & n.10 (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–44). 
247. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). Smith involved law enforcement’s use of a pen register,
which allowed law enforcement to learn the numbers dialed by the defendant.  Id. at 737.  
The Court held that the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers 
he dialed because the telephone company collected that information.  Id. at 744–45. 
248. See Michael Gentithes, The End of Miller’s Time: How Sensitivity Can Categorize 
Third-Party Data After Carpenter, 53 GA. L. REV. 1039, 1054 (2019). 
249. Id. at 1053–54. 
250.  138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
251. See Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357, 
363 (2019). 
186
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[cellular] technologies, intimating that the third-party doctrine is less of a 
bright-line rule and more of a fact-specific standard.”252  The Court 
carefully limited its holding to the facts of the case,253 which has been
interpreted narrowly as applying only to the tracking of an individual’s 
movements over time.254  The Court did not overrule Miller or Smith and 
left the third-party doctrine standing, although on shaky legs.255  However, 
252. Gee, supra note 9, at 428–49.  On a related note, the use of cell phones as
containers of massive amounts of personal information means that they amount to “papers” in 
the context of the Fourth Amendment as intended by the Framers.  See Leah Aaronson, 
Constitutional Restraints on Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 899, 
924 (2015).  “Papers,” at the time of the Framing, included notes, journals, and anything 
written on a sheet of paper.  Jeffrey Bellin, Fourth Amendment Textualism, 118 MICH. L. 
REV. 233, 261 (2019).  Today, these types of records are maintained electronically, and 
these electronically stored records deserve equivalent Fourth Amendment protections.  Id.  
“Books and journals are now ‘PDF’ files and word-processing documents. Emails and 
text messages are today’s letters and notes.”  Id.  However, not all electronic information 
should be classified as Fourth Amendment protected “papers.”  “[E]lectronic information 
that is not consciously communicated or stored—such as a notification sound that rings 
out upon receipt of a text message or an electronic ping emitted by a cell phone, remote 
control, or door opener—would not constitute one’s ‘papers.’”  Id. at 261–62. 
253. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“Our decision today is a narrow one.”); see also 
Hamann & Smith, supra note 24 at 12.  The narrow facts of Carpenter are “that an 
individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the ‘record of his physical 
movements as captured through [cell site location information (CSLI)].’”  MURPHY, supra 
note 136, at 31. The Court “chose not to decide whether there is a limited period for which 
the Government may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI ‘free from Fourth Amendment 
scrutiny’ and limited its main finding to declaring that access to seven days of CSLI 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”  Id. (citing Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2266). While 
the rationale of the majority in Carpenter seems ripe for extension to other categories of 
technology, the opinion fails to provide much in the way of guidance “for citizens, law 
enforcement, and lower courts” for even matters closely related to the core issues in 
Carpenter. See id. at 32. Lower courts have taken this narrowness directive quite literally.  
See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128 YALE 
L.J.F. 943, 950 (2019). 
For example, one district court has held that Carpenter did not apply to grand
jury subpoenas sent to an internet service provider (ISP) and an email provider 
for subscriber information associated with an ISP account and an email address:
“The privacy interest in this type of identifying data . . . simply does not rise to
the level of the evidence in Carpenter such that it would require law enforcement
to obtain a search warrant.” 
Id. at 950 (quoting United States v. Tolbert, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1225 (D.N.M. 2018)). 
254. See Hamann & Smith, supra note 24, at 12. 
255. MURPHY, supra note 136, at 31. Although Professor Ohm noted that Carpenter 
nearly killed the third-party doctrine, Ohm, supra note 251, at 363, Murphy notes that the 
Court instead “opted to distinguish Miller and Smith on the grounds that ‘bank records’ 
and ‘telephone numbers’ are in a ‘qualitatively different’ category to cell site records.”  
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the four dissenters in Carpenter all expressed some type of support for the 
third-party doctrine.256 
The Court’s departure from the third-party doctrine has tremendous 
implications for the use of FRT when evaluating the assembly of facial
databases. By rejecting the third-party doctrine, the Court opened the
door to extending Fourth Amendment protections to photos shared with
third-parties, like social media and other websites.  The decision offers
criminal defendants many opportunities to attack police practices, as 
noted by Paul Ohm: 
In sum, criminal defendants will test the outer boundaries of Carpenter’s
reasoning whenever the police use massive databases assembled by private parties
that reveal location information, directly or by inference.  Other defendants will 
challenge the collection of data unrelated to location.  The broad reasoning of the 
majority’s opinion will give all of them plenty to work with. Anticipating this,
risk-averse police departments will err on the side of caution, getting a warrant
for data whenever they can, sometimes turning promising leads into dead ends.257 
But even stretching the Carpenter rationale to its furthest bounds, it is 
unlikely that the Court will restrict law enforcement from tapping into 
data collected by government agencies.258 Carpenter confronted data 
collected by non-governmental parties.259  Simply put, the altered third-
party doctrine is inapplicable to government data because the government 
is not a third-party at all; rather, it is the prosecution, a direct party in 
criminal litigation. Accordingly, the data willingly provided by millions 
of Americans to the government exposes them to reduced privacy rights. 
Nevertheless, the Carpenter decision opened the door not only to
further relaxation of the third-party doctrine but also the public exposure 
doctrine.  These doctrines, if applied as they had been pre-Carpenter, would 
snuff out any legal basis for holding the use of FRT unconstitutional under 
the Fourth Amendment. However, over the past few decades, the Court
has demonstrated that the use of technology imposes additional questions 
on Fourth Amendment analysis. 
MURPHY, supra note 136, at 31 (citing Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216).  Nevertheless, the 
logic could potentially “be extended to other—non-location based—categories of information
that are conveyed to telecommunications and internet service providers in a future case
with different facts.” Id. 
256. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223–24, 2227–33 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 
2244 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2247, 2257–61 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2262–64, 
2268–69 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
257. Ohm, supra note 251, at 366. 
258. See Rebecca Lipman, Protecting Privacy with Fourth Amendment Use Restrictions, 
25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 412, 446 (2018). 
259. See id.
188
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3. Technology Enhanced Searches 
The drafters of the Constitution could never have conceived of a 
technology that would allow law enforcement to ascertain the identity of 
millions of Americans instantly on sight.  In crafting the Fourth Amendment, 
the drafters protected the “persons, houses, papers, and effects” of 
American citizens from warrantless searches.260  At the time of drafting, 
this was a relatively all-inclusive list of what citizens had; people’s records 
and information were usually kept in their homes—which included offices, 
shops, and barns.261  Today, websites capture and retain enormous amounts 
of personal information via people’s behaviors online.262  The Framers 
intended to protect “the privacies of life”263 and “to place obstacles in the 
way of a too permeating police surveillance.”264  Technology complicates
the analysis because enhancing acceptable surveillance tactics by incorporating 
new technology makes what was previously private by default ascertainable 
by police. The Court has shown that it is willing to depart from traditional 
Fourth Amendment doctrines due to technological developments. 
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court analyzed the use of sense-enhancing 
technology by law enforcement under the Fourth Amendment.265  In that
case, a federal agent used thermal imaging to look through the walls of a 
suspected marijuana grower’s home.266  The Court deemed the use of the
260. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
261. Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Protecting the Fourth Amendment So We Do Not Sacrifice
Freedom for Security, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 1, 5. 
262. See Vito Pilieci, Just How Much of Your Personal Data Is Actually Online? We 
Take a Look, OTTAWA CITIZEN (Apr. 2, 2018), https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/ 
just-how-much-of-your-personal-data-is-actually-online-we-take-a-look [https://perma.cc/
N69S-PG4G].  Facebook, Google, and Twitter alone amassed more than 1.66 gigabytes of 
information for an individual.  Id.  One gigabyte amounts to thousands of pages of documents.  
See John Tredennick, How Many Documents in a Gigabyte? An Updated Answer to that 
Vexing Question, CATALYST (Jan. 13, 2014), https://catalystsecure.com/blog/2014/01/how-
many-documents-in-a-gigabyte-an-updated-answer-to-that-vexing-question [https://perma.cc/
PT6M-BBWK] (varying by document type, a gigabyte could contain between 505 and 7,085
documents); LEXISNEXIS DISCOVERY SERVS., HOW MANY PAGES IN A GIGABYTE? 1 (2007), 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/whitePapers/ADI_FS_PagesInAGig
abyte.pdf [https://perma.cc/N69S-PG4G] (a gigabyte could contain between 15,477 to 297,317
pages depending on document type). 
263. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
264. Id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
265.  533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
266. Id. at 29–30. 
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thermal imaging camera a Fourth Amendment search because “obtaining 
by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of 
the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 
‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search—at 
least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public 
use.”267  “This ‘general public use’ test is now used to determine if information 
gained by new technology is indeed a search.”268 
Courts are unlikely to find law enforcement’s use of FRT a search under 
Kyllo.  Unlike thermal imaging cameras, which are not in general public 
use,269 FRT is widely available for commercial and public use.270  Moreover,
outside the home, the protections added by Kyllo evaporate under most 
lower court interpretations.271  Many lower court decisions further limit
Kyllo to restricting law enforcement’s use of technology to peer beyond 
the walls into the target’s home.272  FRT does not implicate concerns of 
invasion of privacy into the home.  Thus, although FRT is a sense-enhancing 
technology,273 courts will likely distinguish the use of FRT from the facts
of Kyllo and find no search occurred. 
267. Id. at 34–35 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
“To rule [the use of the thermal imaging camera not a search] would allow the police to 
evade the Fourth Amendment’s intended protection of the interior of a private home from 
warrantless search.”  Lenz, supra note 71, at 279. 
268. Baxter, supra note 232, at 226. 
269. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
270. See generally Brandon Amos, Bartosz Ludwiczuk & Mahadev Satyanarayanan, 
OpenFace: A General-Purpose Face Recognition Library with Mobile Applications (Carnegie 
Melon Univ., Sch. of Comput. Sci., Technical Report No. CMU-CS-16-118, 2016), 
http://reports-archive.adm.cs.cmu.edu/anon/anon/usr0/ftp/2016/CMU-CS-16-118.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A74D-LQK8] (exploring the qualitative differences between the more
widely publicly available FRT systems and private, state-of-the-art FRT systems). 
271. See, e.g., United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that dog sniffs outside a vehicle are not protected under Kyllo); United States v. 
Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 1179, 1191 (D. Colo. 2008) (noting that odors escaping the home 
are not revealing of intimate details of home’s interior); United States v. Vela, 486 F. Supp. 
2d 587, 589 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (“There is a clear distinction between the expectation of 
privacy behind the walls of one’s home and the expectation of privacy behind the windows 
of a vehicle.”). 
272. See, e.g., United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 609–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(determining that the use of a cell site simulator to locate a phone within a residence was 
a search); United States v. Vela, 486 F. Supp. 2d 587, 589–90 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (holding 
that using night-vision goggles to observe a vehicle was not a search); Baldi v. Amadon, 
2004 WL 725618, at *2–3 (D.N.H. Apr. 5, 2004) (deciding that the use of a night scope to 
observe the exterior of home was not a search). 
273. FRT is a sense-enhancing technology that assists and augments a human’s
natural ability to see, recognize, and identify faces.  See Amos, Ludwiczuk & Satyanarayanan, 
supra note 270, at 1–3.  However, FRT enhances sight significantly less than thermal 
imaging does—which essentially gave the agents in Kyllo superhuman “x-ray” vision.  
Moreover, even scent-detecting dogs, which can detect odors “at almost non-existent levels,” 
190
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The Court has already evaluated how law enforcement may obtain and 
use data.274  In Riley v. California, the Court analyzed how the immense
data contained on cell phones altered the search incident to arrest exception 
to the warrant requirement.275  The variety and expansive nature of the 
information contained on a cell phone combined with the ability to access 
information beyond the device’s storage make reviewing the data on the 
phone a window into many private aspects of a person’s life.276  Thus, the
Court found searching a cell phone without a warrant violated the Fourth 
Amendment.277 
In Carpenter, the Court implied that pre-digital age search capabilities 
created assumptions of privacy even when in public places, and the Court 
wanted to preserve those reasonable privacy presumptions.278 Carpenter
established a three-factor test for considering technological advancements 
as law enforcement search tools: “(1) ‘the deeply revealing nature’ of the 
especially when compared to human abilities, have been the subject of Kyllo analysis. 
United States v. Whitaker, 820 F.3d 849, 853 n.1 (7th Cir. 2016). 
274. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018); Riley v. California,
573 U.S. 373, 401–03 (2014).  For a detailed analysis of how courts have viewed data 
searches during the electronic data era, see Thomas K. Clancy, Fourth Amendment 
Satisfaction-The “Reasonableness” of Digital Searches, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 37, 38 
(2015).  Courts began to approach issues involving seizure of computers and data storage 
devices differently than they had previously approached seizures of documents.  See id. at 
41–49; see also, e.g., People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 162 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (Martinez, J., 
dissenting) (noting the fundamental differences between computers and traditional “papers” 
because of the communication functions of computers and the breadth of personal information 
contained on such devices). “Fourth Amendment analysis regarding the search and seizure 
of computers must be approached cautiously and narrowly because of the important privacy 
concerns inherent in the nature of computers, and because the technology in this area is 
rapidly growing and changing.”  Gall, 30 P.3d at 165. 
275.  Riley, 573 U.S. at 381, 394. 
276. See id. at 394–98.  Although the Court in Riley limited law enforcement’s free
reign to search the depths of a suspect’s cell phone, cell phones present privacy issues that 
exceed the scope of Riley. For example, browsing history—which third party companies’ 
tracking cookies can mine—implicates similar privacy concerns as does information contained 
on a cell phone.  See Daniel de Zayas, Comment, Carpenter v. United States and the Emerging 
Expectation of Privacy in Data Comprehensiveness Applied to Browsing History, 88 AM. 
U. L. REV. 2209, 2250–51 (2019). 
277. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 393–98. When the Court established the search incident
to arrest exception, the Court only intended to carve out a small exception that was minimally 
invasive. See id.  The search incident to arrest exception, based on the Court’s holdings 
in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), 
outlines two specific justifications for search incident to arrest: ensuring officer safety and 
preventing destruction of evidence. 
278. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
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information; (2) ‘its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach’; and (3) ‘the 
inescapable and automatic nature of its collection.’”279  Applying each of these
factors to FRT demonstrates why privacy advocates have little faith the 
Court will protect against FRT’s deployment. 
First, FRT is not “deeply revealing” in the same way as the Court 
defines historical cell site location information.  The Court returned to its 
analysis in Jones, noting that it was already settled law that individuals 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy of their physical movements.280 
This is strike one against FRT: in contrast to tracking one’s physical 
movements over time, FRT281 identifies a person by their face, which is 
afforded no privacy protections under well-established legal precedent.282 
Second, FRT does not implicate the same level of “depth, breadth, and 
comprehensive reach” as does cell site location information.283  “Depth
refers to the detail and precision of the information stored[;] breadth refers 
to . . . how frequently the data is collected, and for how long the data has 
been recorded[;] comprehensive reach refers to the number of people 
tracked in the database.”284  FRT could implicate the depth aspect if
additional information drawn into the database and provided real-time to 
officers extends beyond what is commonly available to police agencies 
today.285  Nevertheless, the depth aspect is unlikely at issue for information 
contained within state and federal criminal justice databases.  The breadth 
aspect requires a durational standard absent from the application of 
FRT.286  Thus, no considerations of the breadth aspect are appropriate in
evaluating FRT searches.  However, FRT’s implementation implicates the 
comprehensive reach aspect. Looking to government databases of known 
279. Ohm, supra note 251, at 370 (citing Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223). 
280. Lipman, supra note 258, at 446 (noting that it was Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence
in Jones that laid the foundation for the Court’s rationale in Carpenter).
281. It is worth noting that FRT can be employed as a means of tracking, by
incorporating it into surveillance cameras, compiling data over time, to determine where 
a person has been.  This is the potential next iteration of FRT after its deployment as a tool 
to immediately identify people in public.  The idea of tracking people’s movements by 
automated scanning technology is the subject of scholarly analysis.  See, e.g., Brooks, 
supra note 17, at 18 (“By plotting vehicle locations at specific times and tracking their 
movements, [automated license plate scanners (ALPRs)] can be used to paint incredibly 
detailed portraits of drivers’ lives.  These scans can be used to determine past behaviors, 
predict future ones, to solve crimes, or simply to track an individual’s movements.  As 
more ALPRs are used, the portraits they paint will likely continue to grow more detailed 
and invite potential misuse.”). 
282. See supra Section V.B.1.
 283. See Ohm, supra note 251, at 361 (citing Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223). 
284. Ohm, supra note 251, at 372–73. 
285. For example, information posted to social media, provided to the government 
for civil purposes, or obtained via other non-law enforcement means. 
286. Ohm, supra note 251, at 372–73. 
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faces alone reaches millions of Americans.287  Adding non-governmental 
sources of data to the mix makes the reach of FRT almost incomprehensible. 
Finally, the collection and compilation of facial photos in FRT databases 
are neither “inescapable” nor “automatic.”  This factor identifies that 
“individuals might sometimes relinquish their Fourth Amendment rights 
when they assume the risk of surveillance, for example by publishing 
information to the general public.”288  People willingly—aside from
photos captured incident to arrest—provide their images regardless of the 
collection method.289  Although FRT captures images automatically and 
in real-time from a scan, these images are not what comprise the facial 
databases.290 Thus, these images are not the kind of “information” 
collected and stored for future review.  Therefore, this final factor does 
not prevent law enforcement from assembling databases of facial images. 
The sum of these factors offers little indication that the Court would 
find law enforcement’s use of FRT unconstitutional, at least under the 
Carpenter test.  Although, the Carpenter Court’s approach hints that 
increased Fourth Amendment protections may arise out of technology-
enhanced policing,291 nothing in the Court’s analysis provides grounds for
a constitutional challenge to FRT’s use by law enforcement.  To privacy 
advocates, this would not be an ideal result.292  Moreover, even if the Court
does eventually find FRT’s use constitutes a search, the delays in the judicial 
process will necessarily mean the privacy rights of millions of Americans 
will be infringed upon without legislative action. 
287. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-579T, supra note 89, at 6 
(statement of Gretta L. Goodwin, Director Homeland Security & Justice); Garvie, Bedoya 
& Frankle, supra note 66; see also FERGUSON, supra note 88, at 97. 
288. Ohm, supra note 251, at 376. 
289. Users publicly post their photos online, allowing third parties and government 
entities to collect this information.  See Natalie Kim, Note, Three’s a Crowd: Towards Contextual 
Integrity in Third-Party Data Sharing, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 325, 327, 332–33 (2014).  
Citizens opt to provide their photos to the government to obtain licenses and passports. 
290. If FRT cameras—or any other cameras for that matter—were constantly operating
and compiling facial images for future review, the analysis under this factor would change.  
Retroactively reviewing scanned faces captured by these cameras would more likely be 
unconstitutional. 
 291. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Artificial Intelligence and Policing: Hints in the Carpenter
Decision, 16 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 281, 289 (2018). 
292. See supra notes 149–51 and accompanying text; see also Hamann & Smith, supra 
note 24. 
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C. Slow Courts, Fast Technology
Establishing new law through the courts occurs at the pace of a snail in 
molasses, while technology develops at light-speed. New technologies
combine293 to create new challenges that the law has not yet contemplated. 
Development of case law involving advancing technology is the slowest 
mode of the law’s potential adaptability.  Nevertheless, Congress and state 
legislatures leave many legal issues in the hands of the courts.294  To challenge
the use of FRT by law enforcement, a plaintiff must first establish 
standing, requiring a concrete injury attributable to the technology.295 
Even once a party navigates the complexity of proving standing, the case 
must make it through litigation to allow the courts an opportunity to rule.
Furthermore, the likelihood that a legitimate lawsuit goes to trial is 
minute.296  Although some case law does arise out of pre-trial motions, the
293. Smartphones provide perhaps the best example: the iPhone X combines high 
definition display, touch-screen, digital camera, microprocessor, FRT, voice-recognition, 
and battery technologies, to name a few.  iPhone X – Technical Specifications, APPLE (Aug. 9, 
2019), https://support.apple.com/kb/sp770?locale=en_US [https://perma.cc/WLK2-BUU8].
Although this Comment examines the use of FRT by law enforcement, the commercial
implications of its use are readily apparent. The combination of FRT with databases facilitates
targeted messaging to consumers and collection of individuals’ shopping behaviors when 
they visit brick and mortar locations equipped with FRT cameras.  See Elias Wright, Note, 
The Future of Facial Recognition Is Not Fully Known: Developing Privacy and Security 
Regulatory Mechanisms for Facial Recognition in the Retail Sector, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 632–33 (2019).  Facebook already offers advertisers the 
option of targeting “core audiences,” considering consumers’ location, demographics, interests, 
behaviors, and connections.  Ad Targeting: Help Your Ads Find the People Who Will Love 
Your Business, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/business/ads/ad-targeting [https://
perma.cc/B6WK-D92R]. 
294. There are a variety of explanations for this phenomenon: (1) the issue may not 
be of substantial importance to garner legislative attention; (2) the specific challenges that 
cause injury may not be readily apparent until after a harm, see infra note 295; and (3) even if 
legislation is appropriate, the political nature of legislative decision making sometimes render 
passage through multiple legislative bodies and a signature by an executive a practical 
impossibility. 
295. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  Standing requires 
that the plaintiff suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is “fairly . . . trace[able] 
to the challenged action of the defendant.”  Id. at 560–61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare 
Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The issue of standing is 
a sticky one under Fourth Amendment analysis.  See generally Robert H. Whorf, The 
Effects of Eliminating the Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing—Thirty Years in 
Hindsight, 26 THOMAS M. COOLEY L. REV. 555 (2009) (providing an in-depth examination 
of the Fourth Amendment standing problem).  However, in Rakas v. Illinois, the Supreme 
Court effectively dispelled the notion of Fourth Amendment standing and focused on the 
substantive Fourth Amendment inquiry.  439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978). 
296. See Jeffrey Q. Smith & Grant R. MacQueen, Going, Going, but Not Quite Gone, 
JUDICATURE, Winter 2017, at 26, 28, https://judicialstudies.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/01/JUDICATURE101.4-vanishing.pdf [https://perma.cc/GF5P-894B].  Approximately 
1% of civil cases filed in federal court are resolved at trial.  Id. 
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high rate of disposition through settlement deprives the judiciary of the 
opportunity to create law.297  It can take years for the rare case that does 
go to trial to make it to that phase of litigation.298  Because courts may not
have the opportunity to rule on FRT for an extended period, the technology 
could become entrenched in law enforcement practices before courts 
consider its constitutional implications. 
In the Fourth Amendment context, new technology exposes the 
weaknesses of the slow process of judicial law creation.  It took the Court 
over a decade to address law enforcement’s use of thermal imaging as it 
eventually did in Kyllo.299  The search of a cell phone incident arrest, the 
297. See id. at 35. The continued evolution necessary for the development of
common law suffers because of the trend away from trials.
Another weighty concern is how the disappearance of trials impacts the development 
of the law itself.  There are several aspects to this issue.  First, there is the danger 
that law developed only through motions “will be arid, divorced from the full 
factual content that has in the past given our law life and the capacity to grow.” 
Id. (quoting Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal 
Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 
625–26 (2004)).  The authors go on to note additional aspects of the issue: 
Second, the diminishing number of trials will no doubt produce less law relating
to the types of issues that arise at trial.  This, in turn, may lead to greater uncertainty
about trial outcomes and substantive law. . . .  Third, the lack of trials also means 
there are fewer actual verdicts to serve as markers or data points for valuing
claims.
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Amanda M. Rose, The “Reasonable Investor” of Federal Securities 
Law: Insights from Tort Law’s “Reasonable Person” & Suggested Reforms, 43 J. CORP. L.
77, 113–14 (2017)). 
298. See U.S. CTS., TABLE 6.3 U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—MEDIAN TIME INTERVALS (IN 
MONTHS) FROM FILING TO DISPOSITION FOR CIVIL CASES AND CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
(2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jff_6.3_0930.2018.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5NQ5-LF9U]. The average time from filing to disposition in civil matters is
over twenty-six months when the matter goes to trial. Id.  This duration has been steadily 
growing, from eighteen months in 1995 to over twenty-six months in 2018, more than a
45% increase.  Id.  There is little reason to believe that this trend will abate. Thus, the
development of common law is proportionately slow. 
299. By the early 1990s, thermal imaging was in regular use by law enforcement. 
See Susan Moore, Does Heat Emanate Beyond the Threshold?: Home Infrared Emissions, 
Remote Sensing, and the Fourth Amendment Threshold, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 803, 810– 
11 & n.37 (1994).  Academics addressed the issue around the same time.  See, e.g., id.; 
Mindy G. Wilson, The Prewarrant Use of Thermal Imagery: Has This Technological 
Advance in the War Against Drugs Come at the Expense of Fourth Amendment Protections 
Against Unreasonable Searches?, 83 KY. L. REV. 891 (1995). The U.S. District Court for 
Hawaii confronted the issue of thermal imaging’s use as a search of the home as early as 
1991, which was subsequently reviewed by the Ninth Circuit in 1993.  United States v. 
Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991), aff’d, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).  
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subject of Riley, took even longer—almost twenty-five years—for the 
Court to rule upon.300  Cell site location information was used by police
agencies as evidence of a suspect’s location in criminal trials for as long 
as that information was known to be available before being addressed by 
the Court in Carpenter.301  During the intervening years, countless citizens 
were the subject of searches that the Court later decided were unconstitutional.302 
Although some of these searches captured information later used to convict 
those guilty of criminal acts, the police unconstitutionally infringed upon 
the privacy rights of innumerable innocent people, as well.303 
FRT poses an even greater risk to Americans’ privacy.  The examples
mentioned above all involve a level of targeting specific people.  Thermal 
imaging targeted particular suspects’ homes;304 searching cell phones 
incident to arrest involved individuals already under arrest; and, law 
enforcement requested cell site location information to service providers 
for specific people.305  Operators of FRT cannot target suspects in the 
“In the court’s view, the thermal imager was an extra-sensory, non-intrusive device.”
Annabelle L. Lisic, Thermal Imaging and the Fourth Amendment, MD. B.J., Jan.–Feb. 
2001, at 16, 20.  In contrast, the Court in Kyllo held that “[w]here . . . the Government uses 
a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would 
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’
and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27, 40 (2001). 
300. See Allison A. Murphy, Criminal Law—Smith v. Indiana: Pushing the Envelope of
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 447, 449 (1999) (citing 
United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment protections do not apply to a phone number seized from a pager)). 
301. See Shannon Jaeckel, Cell Phone Location Tracking: Reforming the Standard 
to Reflect Modern Privacy Expectations, 77 LA. L. REV. 143, 146 (2016).  See generally 
Laurie Thomas Lee, Can Police Track Your Wireless Calls? Call Location Information 
and Privacy Law, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 381 (2003) (analyzing police use of CSLI 
to track suspects’ movements in the late 1990s and early 2000s). 
302. See Mana Azarmi, Location Data: The More They Know, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & 
TECH. (Nov. 27, 2017), https://cdt.org/insights/location-data-the-more-they-know/ [https://
perma.cc/A8ZB-VUMG].
303. See id.
 304. See Lisic, supra note 299, at 20 (noting that the use of a thermal imager often
followed lengthy investigations into a suspect’s illicit drug activities). 
305. However, the Carpenter court limited its holding, excluding “tower dumps,”
which allow companies to obtain the information of every person whose phone communicated 
with a cell tower over a specified period of time.  See Carpenter v. United States, 138 
S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).  Justice Gorsuch expressed his dissatisfaction with the majority’s 
exclusion of tower dumps, writing: 
Why isn’t a tower dump the paradigmatic example of “too permeating police 
surveillance” and a dangerous tool of “arbitrary” authority—the touchstones of 
the majority’s modified Katz analysis?  On what possible basis could such mass 
data collection survive the Court’s test while collecting a single person’s data does 
not?  Here again we are left to guess. 
Id. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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same way. An FRT camera scans every person who comes within its line 
of sight; the identification process invades each person’s privacy almost 
instantaneously. Where searches later determined to be unconstitutional 
under Kyllo, Riley, and Carpenter likely resulted in the invasion of 
thousands of people’s privacy, almost every person who ventures outside 
could have their privacy exposed in a jurisdiction with FRT-equipped 
police. If left to the courts alone, this result is unavoidable.  As illustrated 
by the analysis above, the Court is ill-equipped to deal with the question 
of cutting-edge technology implemented by law enforcement.306  The tool
the Court lacks to be able to do this effectively is legislation that addresses 
FRT head-on.307 
VI. A PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL STATUTORY SOLUTION
Congress is in the best position to address the use of FRT and its 
invasion into the private lives of Americans.  Any state-enacted legislation 
is likely incapable of addressing the issues of FRT because it is not an 
isolated state issue.  Instead, this is a national problem that only the federal
government can properly address.  However, the national character of the 
issue is not the only justification for congressional action.  The legislative
306. See Kerr, supra note 161, at 809 (“When technology is new or in flux, and 
its use may have privacy implications far removed from property law, Fourth Amendment 
rules alone will tend not to provide adequate privacy protections.  Statutory protections 
are needed to protect privacy and regulate government uses of developing technologies.”).  
More generally, some academics note that courts are not capable of regulating police at 
all.  See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 73 
(2017) (“It is time to face the facts.  The courts are not up to the task of regulating policing.  
At best, all courts can do is declare, after the fact, whether what the police did was consistent 
with the Constitution.  They can’t (and really shouldn’t) write detailed policing policies 
designed to keep things from going wrong in the first place. . . . Indeed, the courts are 
even less democratically accountable than the police themselves.”).  Accordingly, Congress 
must act to protect privacy rights from over-policing.  See infra Part V. 
307. More than just FRT, this issue extends into other areas of expanding policing 
capabilities due to technological advancement.  Other biometric identifying devices deserve 
similar critique.  The accumulation of data is also unprecedented in the history of policing 
—how much should society allow police to know about Americans without taking 
investigative measures authorized at some level?  This Comment does not address this line 
of inquiry or related questions; however, these issues are also worthy of in-depth analysis 
to determine whether the courts can resolve them within the current legislative landscape. 
 197





















       
branch must impose checks on the executive branch to maintain a balance 
of powers between the three branches of government.308 
Congress should act because it alone has the power to write statutes 
governing the agencies responsible for amassing databases of photos necessary 
for the full development of FRT—currently the FBI.309  Although the FBI
falls under the Department of Justice (DOJ),310 which is an executive 
department,311 statutory provisions guide some practices and procedures 
of the DOJ as a whole312 and the FBI specifically.313  For example, 28 
U.S.C. § 534 requires the FBI to collect criminal and identification 
information and distribute it to appropriate agencies.314  It is this provision 
that authorized the FBI to amass its biometric databases;315 however, 
congressional regulation stops short of further limiting the FBI.316 
The only limitations on what images the FBI adds to its facial recognition 
database are its internal policies.317  However, federal agencies have also 
tapped into databases of facial photos that the FBI’s policies exclude from 
its databases.318  This demonstrates that the FBI’s policies are insufficient 
to prevent privacy invasions.  Further, if the FBI deviates from its internal 
policy, there are no legal ramifications.  Thus, Congress should not only 
make the FBI’s policies unbreakable but should also limit other federal 
agencies from creating their own FRT guidelines. 
The statute must specifically address FRT319 because, when it comes to 
advancing technology, applying a wide brush stroke is not effective. The 
intricacies of this technology’s application differ from that of other 
308. See Todd David Peterson, Procedural Checks: How the Constitution (and Congress) 
Control the Power of the Three Branches, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L & PUB. POL’Y 211, 251– 
63 (2017). 
309. See supra Section II.B.1. 
310. 28 U.S.C. § 531 (“The Federal Bureau of Investigation is in the Department of
Justice.”). 
311. Id. § 501 (“The Department of Justice is an executive department of the United 
States at the seat of Government.”). 
312. See, e.g., id. §§ 509–510, 516–519. 
313. See, e.g., id. §§ 534–535, 538. 
314. Id. § 534; see also infra notes 324–27 and accompanying text. 
315. Carrero, supra note 179, at 601 (“[T]he FBI cited 28 U.S.C. § 534 to permit the 
implementation and operation of the NGI System.  This statute is broad enough to allow 
any piece of information that relates to identification records to be stored in a database . . . .” 
(citing DeLillo, supra note 178, at 266)). 
316. See id. (“Essentially, the existing United States privacy laws do not offer much 
protection from government collection and misuse of biometric data.”). 
317. See supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text. 
318. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
319. Although not the subject of this Comment, Congress could apply a similar approach
to law enforcement’s use of other biometric information for identification purposes. 
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technologies, and legislation should address FRT directly.320  Legislators
have spoken out about the disparities in FRT’s capabilities in identifying 
women and people of color,321 which should factor into the crafting of
legislation. Until developers eliminate racial and gender biases from FRT 
systems, allowing law enforcement to use the technology risks disparate 
treatment of minority groups by law enforcement agencies.  Assuming the 
technology improves—as is likely—and FRT becomes bias-free, Congress 
must draft FRT legislation that addresses issues specific to FRT.  The specific 
issues involving FRT that Congress must consider in drafting legislation 
are (1) how law enforcement obtains the photos that comprise the facial 
database and the privacy implications inherent in the photos’ acquisition; 
(2) the purpose of FRT’s use; and (3) the interests in identifying deceased 
and missing persons.322 
Congress must enact a statute to directly address the use of FRT by law 
enforcement. Legislators must balance the public policy benefits of allowing 
the use of FRT against the privacy rights of the general population.323  The
statutory scheme can achieve this balancing with two express measures.  
First, the amended law must limit the photographs included in any law 
enforcement FRT databases to those obtained via criminal investigations 
and subsequent to arrest or incarceration.  Second, the statute must 
authorize a non-law enforcement agency, such as the Department of 
Health and Human Services, to maintain a separate database of faces for 
non-criminal FRT tasks, such as identifying missing or deceased persons. 
320. Lawmakers could also incorporate this into a more complex statutory scheme 
applying to either law enforcement search tools or biometric information obtained by the 
government more generally.  This Comment merely aims to establish that lawmakers should 
not lump FRT into broader categorical legislation that leaves too much open for interpretation 
—and potential exploitation—by law enforcement agencies and provides little guidance 
to the courts. 
 321. See Siegel, supra note 56.  Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.)
addressed the issues of FRT in public statements made in 2019: “We have a technology 
that was created and designed by one demographic, that is only mostly effective on that 
one demographic, and they’re trying to sell it and impose it on the entirety of the country.”  
Id. Representative Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.) has publicly stated “that facial recognition 
technology is broken.”  Id. 
322. See 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(2)–(3).
323. For example, the public interest in identifying missing and deceased persons 
outweighs individual privacy rights.  See supra Part III.  Additionally, information obtained via 
criminal investigations should garner no privacy protections. 
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A. Proposed Amendment to the Current Statutory Scheme
The most logical place to start is with 28 U.S.C. § 534, which governs 
the collection of biometric information.  The statute currently reads, in 
relevant part: 
(A) The Attorney General shall—
(1) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identification,
criminal identification, crime, and other records; 
(2) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve any information 
which would assist in the identification of any deceased 
individual who has not been identified after the discovery 
of such deceased individual; 
(3) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve any information 
which would assist in the location of any missing 
person . . . and provide confirmation as to any entry for 
such a person to the parent, legal guardian, or next of 
kin of that person . . . ; and 
(4) exchange such records and information with, and for 
the official use of, authorized officials of the Federal 
Government, including the United States Sentencing 
Commission, the States, including State sentencing 
commissions, Indian tribes, cities, and penal and other 
institutions.324 
This Comment proposes the following changes—indicated in italics—
to § 534:
(A) The Attorney General shall—
(1) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve information obtained 
related to criminal identification and crime; and 
(a) any images added to the database or repository must 
be obtained via criminal investigations, incident to 
arrest, or by penal institutions; 
(b) images from any other source, including but not limited 
to state driver’s license and identification records, 
applications for civil licenses, State Department records, 
legal immigration procedures, or from any non-
governmental entity may only be collected under 
the parameters specified by subsection (a)(1)(A);
324.  28 U.S.C. § 534. 
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(2) exchange such records and information with, and for the
official use of, authorized officials of the Federal Government, 
including the United States Sentencing Commission, the States, 
including State sentencing commissions, Indian tribes, cities, 
and penal and other institutions.325 
The second aspect of the proposed legislative solution proposes a new 
provision within Title 42 of the U.S. Code: 
(A)  The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall—
(1) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve any information 
which would assist in the identification of any deceased 
individual who has not been identified after the discovery 
of such deceased individual; 
(2) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve any information 
which would assist in the location of any missing person . . . 
and provide confirmation as to any entry for such a person 
to the parent, legal guardian, or next of kin of that 
person . . . ; and  
(3) exchange such records and information with, and for the 
official use of, authorized officials of the Federal 
Government, including the United States Sentencing 
Commission, the States, including State sentencing 
commissions, Indian tribes, cities, and penal and other 
institutions only when— 
(a) pursuant to an authorized warrant; or
(b) in response to a written request that expressly 
relates to the rationale for collecting the information 
under subsections (a)(1)–(2).326 
The above revised statutory scheme separates the management and
administration of the criminal database from that of the non-criminal 
database. The first amendments remove the non-criminal database from 
the Attorney General’s authority.  Further, these changes expressly limit 
how the Attorney General may assemble the criminal database of images 
to law enforcement and correctional inputs alone.  The second, newly-
325. See id. (amended portions in italics).
326. See id. (amended portions in italics).
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proposed addition to Title 42 puts the burden of maintaining a more 
general database in the hands of the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services.327  For this database, no limitations are necessary. The rationale
for these proposed changes follows. 
B. Government Maintained FRT Databases 
1. Limits on Compiling Databases of Faces
Congress should pass legislation that limits the source of photographs 
in databases maintained by law enforcement—both federally and for
collaborations extending across state lines.  With no protection likely to 
come from the bench and Congress’s express authorization to compile and
share biometric information of American citizens for a wide array of
reasons, in the current legal landscape, law enforcement can run wild with 
FRT. 
Moreover, the use of driver’s license databases with FRT creates a
multitude of issues. ICE’s recent access to state DMV records to identify 
immigrants for deportation is particularly concerning.  As noted above, 
FRT is not entirely accurate, especially when it comes to identifying 
members of minority groups.328  Notably, the leading countries of origin 
for removals are all in Latin America with primarily Latino populations,329 
and over 18% of the American population identifies as Hispanic or Latino.330 
The combination of the risk of misidentification with the targeting of a 
minority population is ripe for disparate treatment of that minority group.
Perhaps most frightening, the only limitations on the FBI’s compilation 
of its FRT database are self-imposed.331  Although the FBI claims it does 
not allow its investigative teams or other law enforcement agencies to 
access the FBI’s civil database,332 there is no external legal requirement 
for such a limitation. Thus, the new statutory scheme should impose that 
external limitation.  The identification photographs in any law enforcement 
327. While this solution proposes that the Department of Health and Human Services 
should be responsible for maintaining the non-criminal database, this is merely a suggestion of 
one governmental entity that could manage such a database.  Another entity, assuming its 
authority does not fall below the Attorney General or another law enforcement official—
such as the Census Bureau—would not run contrary to this proposal. 
328. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
329. See FY 2016 ICE Immigration Removals, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 
(Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/2016 [https://perma.cc/S73E-
DHQP]. The leading countries of origin for removals in 2016 were Mexico, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador.  Id. 
330. QuickFacts: United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219 [ https://perma.cc/3TK5-DM2Z] (18.5%).
331. See supra notes 79, 309–19 and accompanying text. 
332. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
202
ZENS_58-1_POST ZENS PAGES FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2021 4:51 PM     
 








   
 
 





    
[VOL. 58:  143, 2021] Face IT 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
FRT database should only include photographs obtained via criminal 
investigations, subsequent to arrest, and obtained by correctional institutions.
2. Establishing an Unidentified Persons Database Managed by a 
Non-Law Enforcement Agency 
The statute should also expressly authorize the creation of a separate
database exclusively for identifying missing and deceased persons. 
However, to prevent misuse and confusion, an agency whose primary aim 
is not criminal law enforcement should compile and maintain this separate 
database. This solution keeps the two sets of data compartmentalized and 
allows the administrating agency to compile the latter database from
images obtained via a wide array of sources.  Because the public interest
in identifying deceased and missing persons outweighs privacy rights, this 
database would face far less stringent limitations. 
Moreover, tasking an agency outside the Attorney General’s authority 
with the responsibility of administrating furthers the goal of identifying 
missing and deceased persons.  A statutory limitation on how the government 
uses citizens’ images mitigates fears of government malfeasance.  Although
some privacy advocates may object to the government maintaining any
such database, this approach balances the government’s legitimate need 
for identifying the missing and deceased with over-surveillance and
privacy concerns.  Thus, the agency in charge of this database could tap 
into a wide array of publicly available images and even contract with private
corporations that specialize in identification and assembly of databases.333 
3. The Criminal Database 
Information and photographs obtained via criminal investigation deserve 
their own database and administration.  First, a person should know whether 
their photograph is, or could be, in the hands of law enforcement.334 Further, 
a total bar on the use of FRT by law enforcement does not serve the best 
interests of society at-large.  Police should integrate developing technologies, 
such as FRT, into their law enforcement techniques to protect the general 
333. See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text. 
334. Law enforcement possesses mugshots and prison inmate photos; however, protections
under this proposed legislation should afford images obtained when investigating a crime, 
such as images captured by surveillance cameras at a crime scene.  By committing a crime, 
a person loses the protection of their image captured incident to their criminal activity. 
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population from criminal actors. This Comment argues that protection
should not, however, come at the expense of diminished privacy to the 
entire population.  Further, the law already limits the rights of convicted 
criminals—a notion society readily accepts.335  Even though law enforcement 
photos would include more than just photos for convicted criminals—
booking photos for arrestees who are not ultimately convicted of an 
offense, for example—the Court has already addressed that arrestees have 
a diminished expectation of privacy.336  By creating a subset of rules for 
335. See Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the
Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 361 (2012). 
In the modern era, criminal disenfranchisement laws persist and largely withstand
constitutional scrutiny.  Courts closely analyze the constitutionality of state
restrictions on the right to vote under fundamental rights jurisprudence. Since 
voting has been deemed a fundamental right, states must show that restrictions on
voting are necessary pursuant to a compelling governmental interest, are narrowly
tailored, and are the least restrictive means of achieving the state’s objective.
However, felon disenfranchisement laws have been exempted from the standard
fundamental rights/equal protection analysis since the Supreme Court’s decision
in Richardson v. Ramirez. 
Id. at 361–62 (footnotes omitted) (first citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964); 
then citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)).  However, “[t]he disenfranchisement 
of felons has long been challenged as anti-democratic and disproportionately harmful to
communities of color.”  Id. at 349.  Although there has been some liberalization of the 
restrictions on felon voting rights, felons still face obstacles to regaining the right to vote.
Id.
In addition to losing the right to vote, convicted felons lose other rights under state law—
varying state to state—including international travel, gun ownership, jury service, employment 
in certain areas, public social and housing services, and parental rights.  What Rights Do 
Convicted Felons Lose?, LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/article/what-
rights-do-convicted-felons-lose [https://perma.cc/K5FX-PEW5]. Like voting rights, the 
restrictions on other restrictions on the rights of felons have loosened to varying degrees.  
One result arising out of the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570 (2008), is the loosening of restrictions on gun ownership by felons.  See 
generally Deborah Bone, The Heller Promise Versus the Heller Reality: Will Statutes 
Prohibiting the Possession of Firearms by Ex-felons Be Upheld After Britt v. State?, 100 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1633 (2010). Two circuit courts upheld the Federal Firearms 
statute—which prohibits the possession of firearms by convicted felons—”on the grounds 
that the Second Amendment did not create an individual right to bear arms.”  Id. at 1634– 
35 (first citing Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 923 (1st Cir. 1942); then citing United 
States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), rev’d, 319 U.S. 463 (1943)).  However, 
“[w]ith its decision in Britt v. State, [681 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 2009),] the North Carolina 
Supreme Court became the first court in the country to hold that a statute criminalizing 
firearm possession by an ex-felon is unconstitutional as applied to the challenging plaintiff 
under a state constitution.”  Bone, supra, at 1633. 
336. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447–48 (2013).  The Court ruled that 
In some circumstances, such as “[w]hen faced with special law enforcement 
needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the 
Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a 
warrantless search or seizure reasonable.” . . . 
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criminal photos, Congress could expressly authorize the FBI’s administration 
of its NGI facial recognition system and codify the FBI’s internal policies 
that protect the privacy rights of the innocent.
Furthermore, by keeping the criminal photo database compartmentalized 
from photos obtained via other means, other federal law enforcement 
agencies—including ICE—cannot run warrantless FRT searches through 
state DMV photo records.  No one expressly agreed to allow law enforcement 
to include the image of their face in facial recognition searches when they 
obtained a driver’s license.  Also, society has a keen interest in people 
obtaining driver’s licenses337 and photo identification more generally. 
The separation of databases also does not preclude law enforcement 
from obtaining driver’s license information from state DMVs as long as 
law enforcement’s request is coupled with a named target.338  A total bar
on law enforcement’s ability to obtain driver’s license information and 
photos could be crippling.  Importantly, this Comment’s proposed rule would 
even allow law enforcement to use FRT in conjunction with facial images 
obtained for driver’s license issuance.339  Law enforcement could acquire
the image of a known person’s face from the state DMV and then use that 
image within an FRT system.  This Comment’s proposed rule would only 
limit the reverse—using the DMV records to identify an unknown person.  
   . . . 
The instant case can be addressed with this background.  The Maryland DNA 
Collection Act provides that, in order to obtain a DNA sample, all arrestees
charged with serious crimes must furnish the sample on a buccal swab applied, 
as noted, to the inside of the cheeks. The arrestee is already in valid police
custody for a serious offense supported by probable cause.  The DNA collection 
is not subject to the judgment of officers whose perspective might be “colored
by their primary involvement in ‘the often competitive enterprise of ferreting 
out crime.’” 
Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001); then 
quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968)).  Similarly, the photos obtained by the police 
following valid arrests should carry no special protections. 
337. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
338. DMV records serve an important function to law enforcement, and state laws 
authorize law enforcement access to particular information.  See, e.g., How Your Information 
Is Shared, CAL. DEP’T MOTOR VEHICLES, https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/driver-education-
and-safety/educational-materials/fast-facts/how-your-information-is-shared-ffdmv-17/ 
[https://perma.cc/9Y3A-7GQC] (explaining that information obtained by the DMV, such 
as residence address, photographs, and vehicle information, is available to law enforcement 
authorized by statute in California). 
339. It would also allow law enforcement to use DMV information and images as
they currently do—mostly to have a clear image of a suspect’s face.  See, e.g., id. 
 205

























    
Thus, a person is not sacrificing the privacy of their faceprint when obtaining 
identification. 
C. Balancing Privacy with Law Enforcement Interests 
The proposed legislation strikes a balance between privacy concerns
and law enforcement’s legitimate interests in deploying FRT.  Failing to
check law enforcement’s use of FRT allows law enforcement agencies to
invade citizens’ privacy in ways never before possible.  Congress must
consider these privacy invasion concerns when evaluating law enforcement’s 
use of technology. Law enforcement should remain on the cutting edge
of technology; criminals exploit technology to circumvent police tactics, 
and lawmakers must allow law enforcement agencies to keep up.  On the 
other hand, private citizens should not suffer the consequences of having
their privacy breached. As technology continues to evolve and law
enforcement’s capabilities extend in unprecedented ways, Congress must
take a careful look at how these new advancements impact the rights of
Americans. Sacrificing fundamental rights under the guise of protecting 
citizens from criminal actors should be a compromise that lawmakers are 
unwilling to make.
VII. CONCLUSION
FRT is an ever-improving technology that has vast implications for the 
everyday lives of Americans.  This Comment focused on the use of FRT
in the law enforcement context, advocating for limiting how law enforcement 
obtains images compiled into facial databases.  However, there remains a
wide array of privacy issues concerning the application of FRT in other 
ways.  This Comment tackled the low hanging fruit of the arguments against
FRT’s widespread implementation—the constitutional problems under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
As noted, the judiciary is ill-equipped to address the problem of FRT’s
use as a search tool by law enforcement.  Under existing Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, courts are likely to uphold law enforcement’s use of FRT 
as constitutional. However, FRT still challenges American privacy in 
ways we should be unwilling to concede without greater consideration.
The courts do not possess the requisite arsenal to address issues of FRT
and other cutting-edge technologies because they fall outside traditional 
understandings of the rights afforded under the Constitution.
Finally, the current statutory framework that governs FRT’s use is sparse. 
Congress has left the matter of technology-enhanced policing in the hands 
of the police; this open authorization would allow FRT’s unimpeded
application by law enforcement agencies. This “fox guarding the henhouse” 
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approach is ripe for abuse. Thus, lawmakers must impose limits on FRT:
Congress should address the challenge of FRT directly and restrict the 
databases of “known faces” to photos obtained via criminal investigative 
and enforcement measures.  Moreover, Congress should codify the FBI’s 
internal policies that are the only limitation on how the agency uses FRT. 
By making this policy binding law, Congress would limit the potential for 
abuses that are an inherent feature of self-policing guidelines. 
How developing technology will impact everyday policing remains in 
the realm of conjecture.  Nonetheless, lawmakers must consider several
interests when permitting or restricting law enforcement’s use of new 
technologies.  First, lawmakers must allow technology-enhanced policing
on some level. Second, they must consider the impact such technologies 
have on accepted rights of American citizens. In the context of FRT,
allowing law enforcement to more easily identify suspects has vast crime
prevention benefits.  However, FRT’s use by law enforcement could also 
infringe upon the privacy rights of all Americans.  The legislative solution
proposed herein balances these concerns.  Most critically, the time for action 
confronting the use of FRT by law enforcement—and similar issues of
technology enhanced policing—is now.
Congress should consider how technology changes police practices before 
they become ingrained as normal police procedures.  Congress must evaluate 
how improved technology used by police impacts the privacy rights of all 
Americans. The wait and see approach—the default for judicial review
of an issue—is simply unacceptable in the context of police practices that 
invade privacy.  If Congress fails to act on FRT, police will scan and
identify millions of Americans with the technology, granting government 
agents unprecedented access to the privacies of those citizens’ lives.
Continued inaction brings us ever closer to an Orwellian surveillance
state. The young person walking down that suburban sidewalk should be 
able to hold their head high and smile at the passing police cruiser without
fear of harassment by an overly invasive face scan.340 
340. Unless there is a warrant authorizing police to find and detain them.  In that case,
FRT is coming for them. 
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